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Abstract 
Globally, since the beginning of the 21st century, there has been over a nine-fold increase in the 
number of deaths from terrorism, rising from 3,329 in 2000 to 32,685 in 2014. In the European 
Union in the first decade of this century 65 cases of jihadi terrorism were recorded. 
Consequently, between 2010 and 2015 Europeans witnessed 32 plots, 11 foiled and 7 failed 
attacks, and were the victims of 18 executed attacks. These total 68 cases of jihadi terrorism that 
affected either a single country and at times multiple ones, rendering the study of the 
characteristics of the individual terrorists, their networks and their modus operandi an imperative 
in order to avoid unwanted surprises, such as the ‘homegrown’ quality of the Madrid 2005 
attackers, and the potential peril posed by returning foreign fighters, as demonstrated by the 
attack on the Jewish Museum in Brussels in 2014. This thesis seeks to contribute to this 
academic literature by exploring three research questions, namely: (1) What are the 
characteristics of the networks behind jihadi terror plots and attacks in Europe between 
2010-2015?; and (2) What are the characteristics of the individual jihadi terrorists between 
2010-2015?; and (3) Have the characteristics of jihadi terrorists in Europe changed between the 
first (2001-2009) and second (2010-2015) decades of the 21st century? 
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Figure 1: Cases of Jihadi Terrorism in the European Union (2010-2015).
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Jihadi Terrorism 
Terrorism is a highly complex and constantly changing phenomenon, but one constant 
throughout time is its ability to make headlines and be at the forefront of national and 
international security agendas. Globally, since the beginning of the 21st century, there has 
been over a nine-fold increase in the number of deaths from terrorism, rising from 3,329 
in 2000 to 32,685 in 2014.  In Europe, it has traditionally manifested itself in the vests of 1
nationalist-separatist movements, right- and left-wing groups; albeit these groups may fly 
different flags for different causes, they share an underlying mix of motivations and 
ideologies. In the case of (transnational) jihadi terrorism, it is a form of political-religious 
terrorism emerging from the combination of Islamist ideology and the idea of jihad. The 
latter can be described as living ‘to strive or struggle in the way of Allah’ and there are 
two levels. The first refers to the ‘Greater Jihad’; the internal struggle each Muslim 
undertakes every day to live in conformity with the teachings of Allah. The second refers 
to the ‘Lesser Jihad’; the struggle to build a good Muslim society.  “It sanctions the use 2
of violence against an unjust ruler, whether Muslim or not, and can become the means to 
mobilize that political and social struggle.”  3
The most violent Islamic groups and networks ignore the greater jihad in favor of 
emphasizing the lesser jihad as “a complete political and social philosophy.”  This study 4
will focus on the violent form of the lesser jihad; individuals whom engage in its pursuit 
are called mujahid/mujahedin, jihadi terrorists or more simply ‘a jihadi’. Their violent 
acts are purportedly perpetrated in the name of furthering the goals of Islam, albeit in a 
 Global Terrorism Index 2015. Rep. Institute of Economics and Peace, 2015. Web. 20 May 2016. <http://1
economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2015.pdf>.
 Ahmed Rashid, Jihad. The rise of militant Islam in Central Asia, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002, p. 2.2
 Bakker, Edwin. “Jihadi Terrorists in Europe: Their Characteristics and the Circumstances in Which They Joined 3
the Jihad: an Exploratory Study.” Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, Dec. 2006. Pg. 1-2. 
Web.
 Ibid.4
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degenerate and typically violent manner. These may include the establishment of a (pan-) 
Islamic theocracy, or the more shortsighted retaliation for perceived violations of the 
Islamic code. 
How this form of terrorism affects a region, and its populations has varied in size and 
shape throughout time. The characteristics of the networks and individuals involved are 
constantly changing, molding the fluidity of organizational structures, and their modus 
operandi. For example, until ‘9/11’ the effects of jihadi terrorism had been primarily 
associated and contained to the Muslim world, a reality that does not hold true today. 
Furthermore, the nature of the networks behind plots and attacks in the recent decade 
have brought to light ulterior characteristics, such as the ‘homegrown’ qualities of the 
individuals behind the Madrid bombings in 2005,  and the current wave of Western 5
foreign fighters (FF).   6
The former are radicalized groups and individuals that are not regularly affiliated with, 
but draw clear inspiration and occasional guidance from official jihadi networks for their 
jihadi endeavors.  The latter are individuals that for a multitude of reasons, but above all 7
the perceived need to defend one’s transnational community, in this case that of the 
ummah, travel and join conflicts, or receive training, in a foreign country. Recent 
estimates speak of more than 30,000 foreign fighters in Syria, of which at least 4,000 
come from Western European countries. Experts estimate that 14% of these people have 
lost their lives, and that approximately 30% have left the conflict zone.  Of the latter 8
category, ‘returnees’ pose a potential threat to their countries of origin; a number of 
 Bakker, Edwin (2011). “Characteristic of Jihadi Terrorists in Europe (2001-2009), in Coolsaet, Rik, Jihadi 5
Terrorism and the Radicalization Challenge. European and American Experiences, Ashgate, Farnham, pp. 131-144. 
Print.
 Van Ginkel, B., and E. Entenmann (Eds.), “The Foreign Fighters Phenomenon in the European Union. Profiles, 6
Threats & Policies”, The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague 7, no. 2 (2016). 
 Pregulman, Ally, and Emily Burke. "Homegrown Terrorism." Center for Strategic and International Studies, Apr. 7
2012. Web. 12 May 2016. <http://csis.org/publication/homegrown-terrorism>.
 Van Ginkel, B., and E. Entenmann (Eds.), “The Foreign Fighters Phenomenon in the European Union. Profiles, 8
Threats & Policies”, The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague 7, no. 2 (2016). 
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violent incidents involving returning FF has legitimized concerns on their intent, and 
raised questions on the feasibility of their reintegration.  A few of these include the 2013 9
attack on Lars Hedegaard in Copenhagen, the 2014 shooting of the Jewish Museum in 
Brussels, and several disrupted plots throughout Member States such as the dismantling 
of the Verviers Cell in 2015. 
1.2. Jihadi Terrorism in Europe 
Traditionally, and prior to the turn of the millennium, European countries have been 
confronted with three types of terrorism: nationalist terrorists, such as the Irish 
Republican Army (IRA) and the Basque Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA); left-wing 
terrorists, such as the Red Army Faction (RAF) and the Red Brigade; and right-wing 
terrorists, such as neo-Nazi groups. Jihadi terrorism only emerged in the 1990s, and it 
took several years to impact the European publics’ threat perception of it. With the 
exception of France, whose nationals had experienced jihadi terrorism in the vests of the 
Armed Islamic Group (GIA) in the 1990s, national consciousnesses were not alert or 
fearing the jihadi terrorists until the turn of the century.  10
In the first decade of the 2000s, jihadi terrorists in Europe, more often than not, presented 
homegrown and semi-autonomous characteristics. In fact, many of the plots and attacks 
hatched between 2001 and 2006 show no clear link with established, formal jihadi terror 
networks. Consequently, this means that individuals seeking to undertake their perverted 
understanding of lesser jihad are capable of doing so without the support, nor the training 
and coordination offered by official networks such as al-Qaeda. Marc Sageman, in his 
book Leaderless Jihad, describes how global jihadi networks at the end of the last decade 
 Bakker, Edwin, and Jeanine De Roy Van Zuijdewijn. "Jihadist Foreign Fighter Phenomenon in Western Europe: A 9
Low-Probability, High-Impact Threat." Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism Studies ICCT Research Papers (2015). 
Web. 05 Mar. 2016.
 Bakker, Edwin. “Jihadi Terrorists in Europe: Their Characteristics and the Circumstances in Which They Joined 10
the Jihad: an Exploratory Study.” Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, Dec. 2006. Pg. 4. 
Web.
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have evolved “into more fluid, and unpredictable home-grown entities.”  This does not 11
mean that during this period there was no connection between cells operating in Europe, 
and their global counterparts; many of the home-grown ‘wannabes’ are still guided by 
propagandist material often spread online. Notably in Europe, as compared to Sageman’s 
global conclusions, in this period of time there is a much more direct link between the 
European cell and groups operating in places such as Iraq and Afghanistan.  12
Furthermore, the nature of recent terror attacks executed in Member States further raises 
concerns weather this still holds true. For example, the cell that struck Paris in November 
2015 presented a variegated picture composed of home-grown jihadis connected via 
fraternal and friendship bonds, many of which received training in Syria with the Islamic 
State (IS), where the plot was allegedly concocted, and ultimately it was coordinated by 
an IS officer. He reportedly travelled frequently between Europe and Syria, coordinating 
several attacks and plots in different Member States. Consequently, the changing nature 
of the networks behind jihadi terror activities makes gathering information on their 
characteristics and the individuals that comprise them an imperative of counterterrorism 
research. In this regard, the thesis seeks to answer three research questions: 
• What are the characteristics of the networks behind jihadi terror plots and attacks in 
Europe between 2010-2015? 
• What are the characteristics of the individual jihadi terrorists between 2010-2015? 
• Have the characteristics of jihadi terrorists in Europe changed between the first 
(2001-2009) and second (2010-2015) decades of the 21st century? 
 Sageman, Marc. Leaderless Jihad. University of Pennsylvania, 2008. Print.11
 Bakker, Edwin (2011). “Characteristic of Jihadi Terrorists in Europe (2001-2009), in Coolsaet, Rik, Jihadi 12
Terrorism and the Radicalization Challenge. European and American Experiences, Ashgate, Farnham, pp. 134. 
Print.
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1.3. Research on Jihadi Terrorism 
Jihadi terrorism, its networks and those involved in them, has been an important focus-
topic within academia, governments, and research institutions. These studies concentrate 
on the different spheres of the form of terrorism under scrutiny in this study, such as the 
networks and the aims of terrorists and their organizations, how this is reflected in the 
different modi operandi, or what compels a seemingly regular individual to pick up this 
deranged form of jihad.  
Governments and intergovernmental organizations collect information on terrorist 
activities on their territory, or their constituents, and produce reports of the incidents. For 
example, the U.S. Department of State publishes its annual Country Reports on 
Terrorism, presenting an overview of the year’s terrorism situation, events, and the 
counterterrorism policies adopted by countries in the world. Similarly, Europol each year 
releases its EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT), analyzing precisely what 
its title hints to: the overall terrorism situation in each Member State and the Union, and 
the underlying trends that shaped the phenomena. Yet, with the exception of very 
renowned incidents, publications such as these do not offer detailed information of the 
individuals, nor of the underpinning characteristics structuring these networks. For 
example, much is known of Mohamed Merah, the perpetrator of the Toulouse and 
Montauban attacks, but little is know of individuals and networks behind the foiled plots 
to blow up the London Stock Exchange in 2010, and the plot to perform a ‘Mumbai-
Style’ attack across Europe the same year. Hence, additional valuable governmental 
documents for the scope of this research include transcripts of legal proceedings, and the 
reporting of terrorist issues to the various national parliaments. 
The body of literature on jihadi terrorism, and on the individuals and networks 
implicated, is quite limited, and includes work by, amongst others, Lorenzo Vidino, 
Tomas Precht, Linsday Clutterbuck, Rick Coolsaet, Magnus Ranstorp, Peter Neumann, 
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Thomas Hegghammer, Petter Nesser, Marc Sageman, and Edwin Bakker.  Also, a 13
number of studies have applied interdisciplinary approaches to the problem at hand, such 
as the work by Daniela Pisoiu,  which avails itself of socio-psychological theories to 14
explain the process of radicalization, and Freilich, Adamczyk, Chermak, et al, which 
focus on the overlapping characteristics between criminal and terrorist networks.  15
Ulteriorly, a substantial amount of research has been done on radicalization, such as that 
by Silke, Jacuch, Speckhard, and Pick;  on the role of women in the jihad, such as the 16
work by von Knop;  and studies on the growing number of Western foreign fighters and 17
trainees, such as the work by Alex Schmid, and Mendelsohn.  Additionally, open sources 18
such as journalistic networks often present detailed profiles of perpetrators if the attack 
resonated markedly in the general population. 
The thesis will heavily build on the research done by Edwin Bakker, in particular it will 
be an extension and an update of two previous projects by Bakker. The first being Jihadi 
Terrorists in Europe (2006), and the second being Characteristics of Jihadi Terrorists in 
 Vidino, Lorenzo. The New Muslim Brotherhood in the West. New York: Columbia UP, 2010; Precht, Tomas. 13
"Islamist Terror in the West: The Emergence of the Home-Grown Threat." (2015); Clutterbuck, Linsday, and 
Richard Warnes. "Exploring Patterns of Behaviour in Violent Jihadist Terrorists: An Analysis of Six Significant 
Terrorist Conspiracies in the UK” ; Coolsaet, Rik, ed. Jihadi Terrorism and the Radicalisation Challenge: European 
and American Experiences. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2013; Ranstorp, Magnus. Understanding Violent 
Radicalisation: Terrorist and Jihadist Movements in Europe. London: Routledge, 2010; Neumann, Peter Neumann, 
Peter. The New Jihadists: ISIS, Europa and the Next Wave of Terrorism; Sageman, Marc. Understanding Terror 
Networks. Philadelphia: U of Pennsylvania, 2004; Bakker, Edwin. “Jihadi Terrorists in Europe: Their Characteristics 
and the Circumstances in Which They Joined the Jihad: an Exploratory Study.” (2006); Nesser, Petter, and Anne 
Stenersen. "The Modus Operandi of Jihadi Terrorists in Europe." Perspectives on Terrorism 8.6 (2014).
 Pisoiu, Daniela. "Coming to Believe “Truths” About Islamist Radicalization in Europe." Terrorism and Political 14
Violence 25.2 (2013).
 Freilich, Joshua D., Amy Adamczyk, Steven M. Chermak, Katharine A. Boyd, and William S. Parkin. 15
“Investigating the Applicability of Macro-Level Criminology Theory to Terrorism: A County-Level Analysis.” 
Journal of Quantitative Criminology J Quant Criminol 31.3 (2014): 383-411. Web. 
 Silke, Andrew. "Holy warriors exploring the psychological processes of Jihadi radicalization." European journal 16
of criminology 5.1 (2008); Pick, Thomas M., Anne Speckhard, and Beatrice Jacuch. Home-grown Terrorism: 
Understanding and Addressing the Root Causes of Radicalisation among Groups with an Immigrant Heritage in 
Europe.
 Von Knop, Katharina. "The Female Jihad: Al Qaeda's Women." Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 30.5 (2007).17
 Schmid, A. P. and J. Tinnes. “Foreign (Terrorist) Fighters with IS: A European Perspective”, The International 18
Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague 6, no. 8 (2015); Mendelsohn, Barak. "Foreign Fighters—Recent Trends." 
(2011).
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Europe (2001-2009). In order to answer its research questions, the thesis will follow the 
methodological framework of the aforementioned researches, and its results will be cross-
analyzed with their conclusions in order to tailor a picture of jihadi terrorists and their 
networks in Europe from 2001 until 2015. Unfortunately, Bakker does not avail himself 
of international relations theory, nor of political science currents, making it hard to tailor 
a purely theoretical framework for this thesis’ predictions. Hence, the thesis will use the 
conclusions reached by Bakker and Sageman in their work as the theoretical 
underpinning on which to roughly predict the outcome of this research. In the subsequent 
three sections the theoretical framework and methods of analysis and data collection will 
be outlined, along with the methodological complications encountered. 
1.4. Theoretical Framework 
The work by Bakker is heavily based on the prior work by Sageman (2003), from which 
he derives his theoretical frameworks, and methodological characterizations. Sageman, in 
Understanding Terror Networks, seeks to rebuke theoretical and popular notions that 
typically shape the discourses surrounding the individuals and networks behind jihadi 
terrorist acts; this is also the objective of Bakker’s subsequent work. Some of these 
notions include the role of socioeconomic class, relative deprivation, education, 
criminality, and others. Through and through, Sageman and Bakker investigate 18 
variables to figure out common features of how and why individuals joined jihad, and 
ascribe them to three categories: social background, psychological make-up, and the 
circumstances of joining the jihad. Each variable is related to one or more research 
questions tied to general notions and theoretical assumptions of terrorism. For example, 
the ‘socioeconomic status’ of a terrorist is tied to assumptions that poverty contributes to 
radicalization in asymmetrical power situations, and ‘family status’ challenges the 
common notion that it is typically single men that would engage in jihad.  
Sageman’s sample, spanning up until 2003, leads him to discredit social explanations and 
debunk the stereotype that terrorists are typically poor, angry and fanatically religious 
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men. His sample is widely middle class, and made-up of educated young men from 
caring and religiously sound families, most of whom were married with children. 
Consequently, he rejects brain washing and recruitment to account for the process of 
undertaking violent, lesser jihad, and instead argues for a three-prong process. Firstly, the 
individual at risk socially affiliates him/herself with jihad through friendship, kinship or 
discipleship bonds; successively, there is the progressive intensification of beliefs and the 
acceptance of jihadi ideology; lastly, there is the formal acceptance of the jihad through 
the encounter of a link to the global Salafi network. Sageman emphasizes the role played 
by social bonds as the crucial element both in the affiliation with the jihadi ideology, and 
in the formal acceptance step by the global Salafi network. In fact, most individuals from 
his sample radicalized as ‘a bunch of guys’, rather than individually; without the link to 
the global Salafi network, most of these candidates would remain sympathizers rather 
than full-fledged mujahedin. 
The subsequent work by Bakker has shown that several of these developments are not as 
frequent in the European jihadi terrorist scene, and in particular the formal recognition by 
‘official’ terrorist organizations, such as al-Qaeda, does not seem necessary anymore. 
Bakker’s sample comprises 65 cases of jihadi terrorism between 11 September 2001 and 
31 December 2009 that involved at least 336 people.  The networks behind the European 19
plots and attacks seem to be more self-organized, and self-recognized groups or networks 
varying in size from large networks to cases presenting single ‘lone-wolf’ jihadis. There 
are a few more differences between the two researchers’ samples. Regarding their 
recruitment, the constituents of Sageman’s global Salafi sample were recruited far from 
home, their friends and families; European jihadis had joined under the precise opposite 
circumstances, and primarily on the individual’s own will, making the process more of 
self-recruitment rather than of being recruited. Moreover, Sageman’s global Salafi 
jihadis, as compared to their European counterparts, are full-time committed and 
 Bakker, Edwin (2011). “Characteristic of Jihadi Terrorists in Europe (2001-2009), in Coolsaet, Rik, Jihadi 19
Terrorism and the Radicalization Challenge. European and American Experiences, Ashgate, Farnham, pp. 131-144. 
Print.
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employed to their religious struggle; European jihadis had full time jobs, completed 
different levels of education, and essentially resembled every-day people’s lives. 
Ultimately, in Europe kinship bonds were more of an important factor for recruitment; in 
the global Salafi networks it was friendship. 
Henceforth, jihadi terrorist networks’ characteristics change with regards to time and 
location, and unfortunately the work by Bakker covers cases up until 2009. Since then, 
there are a multitude of events that may have been changing the features of these 
networks and groups. For example, the decision by the Islamic State to declare a 
caliphate, and subsequently to call upon its followers to migrate and establish new 
communities in its territory may have been impacting the demographics of those 
prosecuted under terrorism laws in Europe. The purpose of this thesis is to uncover 
whether jihadi terror networks in Europe have been changing, or whether the antecedent 
conclusions still hold true. Consequently, it is imperative to have a clear picture of those 
behind jihadi terror plots and attacks in Europe, both for policy-formulation purposes and 
for current (counter-)terrorism and counter-radicalization approaches. 
1.5. Methods of Analysis and Data Collection 
The research design structuring the thesis will be a large-n, across-time comparative 
analysis for theory building purposes. Few studies have focused on the characteristics of 
jihadi terrorists and the networks they form, rendering this research an imperative of 
counter-terrorism endeavors. This lack of information on the persons behind jihadi terror 
plots and attacks in the European Union in the past created a fertile ground for 
misconceptions, heeding way to unwanted surprises, such was the ‘homegrown’ nature of 
the jihadis behind the 2005 metro bombing in Madrid. Consequently, the purpose of this 
thesis is theory development, and not theory testing, adopting a ‘building bloc’ approach 
to fill the gaps.  
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According to George and Bennet, “building block” studies of particular types or subtypes 
of a phenomenon identify common patterns or serve a particular kind of heuristic 
purpose. These studies can be component parts of larger contingent generalizations and 
typological theories, especially in the event of a complex and broad phenomena such as 
jihadi terrorism is. Moreover, the added value of the approach in question is that it 
permits to identify alternative causal paths to similar outcomes when equifinality is 
present.  This is done by analyzing the building blocks, or subtypes, of the overarching 20
phenomenon; each block fills a “space” in the overall typological theory. Each 
component provided by each block is itself a contribution to theory; though their 
individual scope may be limited, they address the important problem or puzzle associated 
within the phenomena. Its generalizations are more narrow and contingent than those of 
the general “covering laws”. “In other words, the building block developed for a subtype 
is self-sufficient; its validity and usefulness do not depend upon the existence of other 
studies of different subclasses of that general phenomenon.”  21
In the context of this thesis the building block approach serves to gain a greater 
understanding of the overarching phenomenon of jihadi terrorism by scrutinizing its 
subtypes of events, or cases -i.e. plots, failed, foiled, and executed attacks. It will do so in 
an iterative manner by scrutinizing the biographies of individuals and networks behind 
these cases according to the 18 variables tailored by Bakker and Sageman. In fact, the 
equifinality George and Bennet refer to, in this thesis, is the undertaking of violent, lesser 
jihad. Consequently, by analyzing the multitude of biographies of the individual jihadi 
terrorist and networks, the thesis seeks to contribute to the development of a typological 
theory understanding of what are the characteristics of someone who undertakes this form 
of jihad, specifically in the time period between 2010 and 2015. Ulteriorly, although the 
analysis is descriptive in nature, it will also test hypotheses, or assumptions, ‘implicit’ to 
 George, Alexander L., and Andrew Bennett. "Chapter 3: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison." Case 20
Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences. Cambridge, MA: MIT, 2005. Pg. 76. Print.
 George, Alexander L., and Andrew Bennett. "Chapter 3: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison." Case 21
Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences. Cambridge, MA: MIT, 2005. Pg. 78. Print.
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the variables whenever possible; these are the afore mentioned popular notions that shape 
discourses surrounding terrorists and their networks.  22
The criterion discerning the two time periods is contingent on its precursory research, 
hence the distinction between the 2001-2009 and the 2010-2015 time blocs. The variables 
will be standardized throughout the cases, and will strictly follow the operationalizations 
of the studies it builds upon.  The data for the time period between 2001 and 2009 will 23
derive from the two antecedent studies, and for the subsequent time period between 2010 
and 2015 the data will be collected for this thesis. In particular it will derive from open 
sources, briefings to national parliaments, legal transcripts, statements from ministries’ 
websites, and other governmental agencies. Ulteriorly, datasets such as the Global 
Terrorism Database by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and 
Responses to Terrorism (START), and overviews of terrorist incidents such as Europol’s 
Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT), and the U.S. Department of State’s 
Country Reports on Terrorism have been used. The data spanning from 1 January 2010 
until 31 December 2015 was researched through February 2016 and April 2016; the final 
dataset comprises 68 jihadi terror plots and attacks that involved at least 161 persons in 
the European Union between 2010 and 2015. 
Jihadi terrorist cases have been identified in the following procedure. Firstly, the 
researcher gathered information on terrorist incidents in European Member States, 
including failed and foiled plots reported in the media. Successively, cases in which 
terrorists claimed to adhere to jihadi ideology have been selected. And lastly, cases have 
been selected in which people were formally charged, and taken into custody for an 
 Listing each variable and the assumptions or ‘implicit’ hypotheses tied to each is not possible; it would require a 22
much more extensive literature review pushing the thesis outside of the word-limit set for it. Consequently, those 
that could be tested have been included in the various analyses in chapters three, four, five, and in chapter six’s 
conclusions.
 For length and legibility purposes of this chapter, the variables’ individual operationalizations have been included 23
in their analysis in the subsequent chapters.
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extended period of time;  in which they were convicted for terrorist activities; or in 24
which they committed suicide during or right after the attack. Hence, jihadi terrorist acts 
include both violent attacks and activities in support of these acts, such as financing, 
recruiting, and the purchasing of arms or explosives.   25
Cases have been excluded if the target of the act was outside of the EU, for example 
collecting funds in Belgium for an operation in Iraq would be excluded, or if the 
perpetrators were Muslim and motivated by an Islamist ideology but not by a jihadi 
purpose. Finally, cases have been excluded if there was not enough information available 
to verify the facts; or in the instances in which no one was charged or if the perpetrator 
has not been brought to trial yet and has not been in custody for at least one year. The 
reasoning behind these last two exclusions is that often after a major event countless 
people get rounded up by the authorities, with very few being formally charged. 
Furthermore, certain Member States’ laws allow for a terrorism suspect to be detained for 
protracted periods of time without being formally charged, whilst in the meantime a 
media frenzy of information has already been unleashed. 
Consequently, the definitional criteria guiding the research in regards to individuals, 
networks and terrorist acts are defined as follows. Cases have been categorized as a plot 
if plans for the attack were not fully manifest; as a foiled attack if it was discovered and 
prevented in time as the jihadis were finalizing their plans, and were nearly ready to act; 
as a failed attack when it was not successful as a result of shortcomings at the last minute 
by the terrorists; or as an executed attack, when the terrorists were capable of at least 
initiating the execution phase of their plan, and their actions can be ascribed to terrorist 
acts as defined by the European Council. The Council ascribes to its definition intentional 
acts which are committed with the aim of: seriously intimidating a population, or unduly 
 Following its antecedent studies, the minimum time set for this research was one year.24
 Bakker, Edwin. “Jihadi Terrorists in Europe: Their Characteristics and the Circumstances in Which They Joined 25
the Jihad: an Exploratory Study.” Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, Dec. 2006. Web.
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compelling a government or international organization to perform or abstain from 
performing any act, or seriously destabilizing or destroying the fundamental political, 
constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international 
organization.  Moreover, the term jihadi is used if the individuals are linked to the 26
violent pursuit of the ideology holding Islam as not just a religion, but also as a social and 
political system that governs legal, economic and social imperatives of a community 
according to its interpretation of Islamic law. The research will speak of a terrorist or 
terrorists if it relates to persons committing acts as formulated by the European Council. 
The individuals and networks meeting the afore mentioned criteria will be included in the 
research sample, and thus will be scrutinized according to the three categories of 
variables used by Bakker, tailored upon Sageman’s work. Namely these are: 
• Social background: gender, geographical origins (including nationality, country of 
origin, country of residence, and where they were raised); socioeconomic status; 
education; faith as youth; occupation; and family status. 
• Psychological make-up: mental illness; terrorist personality.  27
• Circumstances of joining jihad: age; place of recruitment; faith; employment; relative 
deprivation; friendship; kinship; discipleship; worship. 
Ultimately, the resulting analysis will be used to tailor an overview of jihadi terrorists and 
the networks implicated in plots, and attacks that were either foiled, failed or were 
successful between 2010 and 2015. These results will be cross-analyzed with the 
conclusions reached by Edwin Bakker with the finality of discerning whether the trends, 
and the characteristics of these individuals and their networks still hold as tenets in the 
second decade of the 21st century, or whether they are confined to the first. With these 
objectives in mind, the restrictions concerning geographical scope and time-frame were 
 Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism, (2002/475/JHA). 26
 Sageman, in oder to accommodate mental health professionals who seek explanations for terrorism in terms of 27
pathological personality dynamics, distinguished these from mental illnesses (Sageman, Marc. Understanding 
Terror Networks. Philadelphia: U of Pennsylvania, 2004. Pg. 83. Print.). Unfortunately, in order to perform this 
distinction, a researcher would have to have a strong grasp of psychological theories. Consequently, following 
Bakker’s categorization, both have been ascribed to the ‘psychological explanations’ variable.
!  of !19 73
chosen in order to produce the most accurate comparison between samples,  and to 28
identify similarities and differences that contributed to an individual’s choice to undertake 
violent, lesser jihad. 
1.6. Methodological Complications 
It was considerably complicated to compile a reliable dataset on jihadi terrorists and a list 
of plots and failed, foiled, and successful attacks for a number of reasons. Firstly, albeit 
hundreds of people are arrested each year in Member States, an overwhelming majority is 
released within little time, often without being charged;  this is especially true in 29
politically sensitive moments, such as in the aftermath of an attack or during a country’s 
election cycle.  This is complicating because initial media reports are often not based on 30
formal legal charges or other official documents, rather they can be based on spotty 
fragments of information.  Additionally, in cases in which not much is known 31
information can be misrepresented at first, such as whether a perpetrator was motivated 
by jihadi ideology or not. Secondly, these networks are often not set in stone, with 
individuals’ involvement overlapping between networks or via family or friendship 
bonds. It is precisely because more often than not these are ill-defined networks of 
people, rather than solidified groups or organizations, that the thesis speaks of networks 
rather than groups.  
 Besides the 2010-2015 timeframe, the geographical restriction follows that applied by Bakker.28
 Bakker, Edwin. “Jihadi Terrorists in Europe: Their Characteristics and the Circumstances in Which They Joined 29
the Jihad: an Exploratory Study.” Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, Dec. 2006. Pg. 16. 
Web.
 Oates, Sarah. "Comparing the Politics of Fear: The Role of Terrorism News in Election Campaigns in Russia, the 30
United States and Britain." International Relations 20.4 (2006): 425-37. Web. 16 Mar. 2016; and Samuel, Henry. 
"France Election 2012: Nicolas Sarkozy Accused of Using Islamist Terror Swoops to Boost Campaign." The 
Telegraph. Telegraph Media Group, 2012. Web. 17 May 2016.
 Bakker, Edwin (2011). “Characteristic of Jihadi Terrorists in Europe (2001-2009), in Coolsaet, Rik, Jihadi 31
Terrorism and the Radicalization Challenge. European and American Experiences, Ashgate, Farnham, pp. 131-144. 
Print. 
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Lastly, the greatest obstacle in depicting jihadi terror networks and the characteristics of 
those involved stems from the limitations of open source information, the lacking 
reliability of open source information, and the apparent bias of different journalistic and 
other publications. The media, public prosecutors, and defense lawyers alike oftentimes 
produce ‘stories’ that are unsustainable in court, and undeniably grant more attention to 
them in the aftermath of an attack or wide-spread arrests, rather than subsequent to 
acquittals or small-scale plots. Furthermore, time and again publications focus only on 
key elements of the networks, neglecting more peripheral actors that were nonetheless 
involved.   32
Yet, research based on open sources such as this thesis in (counter-)terrorism studies are 
frequent and nevertheless necessary due to the problematics inherent to primary sources, 
such as privacy and security-related concerns.  Consequently, the scarcity of primary 33
sources increases the value of secondary sources, especially in light of quantitative 
studies and the databases upon which they are based. The information present in 
databases such as the one accrued for this thesis, place less of a premium on access to 
primary sources. Think of, for instance, gaining access to the individuals comprised in 
such databases, which would be near-to-impossible for persons alive, and even less so for 
those who are deceased at the time of writing.   
 Ibid.32
 Schuurman, Bart, and Quirine Eijkman. "Moving Terrorism Research Forward: The Crucial Role of Primary 33
Sources." ICCT Background Research Note (n.d.): pag. 5. International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, June 2013. 
Web. 15 May 2016.
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Despite these difficulties, following the afore mentioned criteria it was possible to tailor a 
database spanning 2010-2015 comprising 68 cases, involving at least 161 individuals. 
The remainder of the thesis will scrutinize these following the 18 variables outlined by 
Bakker, tailored upon Sageman, and is structured as follows: in the following chapter the 
2010-2015 jihadi terrorism cases, and their networks will be outlined; chapter three will 
scrutinize the jihadi networks active in Europe between 2010 and 2015; chapter four will 
analyze the biographies of the individual jihadis for the time period between 2010 and 
2015; these will be subsequently cross-compared with their 2001-2009 counterparts in 
chapter five; and lastly, chapter six concludes.  
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2. Cases of Jihadi Terrorism in Europe, 2010-2015 
Throughout the 2010-2015 period Europeans witnessed 32 plots, 11 foiled and 7 failed 
attacks, and were the victims of 18 executed attacks. EU Member States were able to foil 
several plots such as those planned by the network in Verviers in 2015  and the UK-34
based “Turnup Terror Squad” in 2014,  whilst others failed due to shortcomings by the 35
terrorists, such as in the cases of the failed attacks on the Bonn train station  and on Pro-36
NRW politicians in 2012.  Unfortunately, other jihadi terror plans were executed, in 37
some cases reaping hundreds of victims, as in the case of the November 2015 Paris 
attack,  whilst in others the intended victim(s) escaped unharmed with the only toll being 38
taken by national resilience and morale, or by the unity of national sub-communities. In 
fact, in certain attacks the jihadi terrorist had as the secondary objective the creation of 
animosity and augmenting the negative perceptions amongst the sub-communities in 
which s/he grew up, such as the 2011 plot to attack Jewish communities in Manchester,  39
and the failed attack on English Defense League supporters in 2013.  40
 Bergen, Peter, Courtney Schuster, and David Sterman. "ISIS in the West." (2015). International Security Program, 34
N o v. 2 0 1 5 . We b . 1 6 M a y 2 0 1 6 . < h t t p : / / a p o . o rg . a u / f i l e s / R e s o u r c e / i s p - i s i s - i n - t h e - w e s t -
v2.b4f2e9e3a7c94b9e9bd2a293bae2e759.pdf>.
 Greenwood, Chris. "Dramatic Moment Anti-Terror Police Arrested Medical Student Dubbed The Surgeon Over 35
Alleged ISIS-Plot to Attack Britain – In a Flat Just Yards from Scene of Raid on 21/7 Bombers." Mail Online. 
Associated Newspapers, 09 Oct. 2014. Web. 20 May 2016. <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2783689/Four-
men-arrested-suspicion-terror-offences-series-raids-London.html>.
 "Man Accused of Plotting Bonn Station Bombing." DW.COM. 14 Mar. 2014. Web. 14 May 2016. <http://36
www.dw.com/en/man-accused-of-plotting-bonn-station-bombing/a-17498279>.
 Ibid.37
 "Unraveling the Connections Among the Paris Attackers." The New York Times. The New York Times, 14 Nov. 38
2015. Web. 20 May 2016. <http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/11/15/world/europe/manhunt-for-paris-
attackers.html?_r=0>.
 "Manchester Terror Plot Couple Sentenced." Community Security Trust, 20 July 2012. Web. 20 May 2016. 39
<https://cst.org.uk/news/blog/2012/07/20/manchester-terror-plot-couple-sentenced>.
 Jackson, Andrew. "Plot to Attack Dewsbury EDL Rally Failed as Terrorists Turned Up Late - Then Had Car 40
Impounded on Way Home.” The Huddersfield Examiner. 30 Apr. 2013. Web. 20 May 2016. <http://
www.examiner.co.uk/news/west-yorkshire-news/plot-attack-dewsbury-edl-rally-4930357>.
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Following the steps outlined in Chapter 1, 68 cases and 60 networks were identified. The 
number of networks behind the jihadi terror plots and attacks is lower than the actual case 
count, meaning that certain individual networks were responsible for multiple plots or 
attacks. This is the case of the network surrounding Abdelhamid Abaaoud, whom is 
purportedly responsible for orchestrating the November 2015 Paris attacks and of 
coordinating a cell in Verviers, amongst other plots. Moreover there are also instances of 
networks made up by a single individual, whom may have radicalized on his own whim, 
such as the lone-wolf attackers in Tours and Berlin, and in other situations they had some 
form of connection to an official jihadi organization. This is the case of the al-Qaeda 
linked Irfan Naseer and  Dusseldorf cells. Ultimately, the fluidity of these networks needs 
to be kept into account; oftentimes their members overlap or are interlinked via 
friendship, fraternal, or marital bonds. This holds true for the wife of one of the 
accomplices in the Wootton Basset plot, a former MET officer, who is also the sister of 
two brothers implicated in the 2010 plot to blow up the London Stock Exchange. 
Each case and network was named based on the name given by intelligence and security 
services, or following the named coined by the media, or based on the case’s information 
and peculiarities.  Furthermore, the date ascribed to the cases are either the time of 41
arrests for plots, foiled and failed attacks; and in the cases of executed attacks the first 
day on which the attack began was chosen for categorization purposes. The same 
criterion has been applied for cases in which arrests spanned over a multitude of days, 
sometimes weeks; in such instances the date chosen coincides with the first arrest. If a 
case’s title only figures ‘plot’, and no adjunct label such as failed, foiled, or executed 
attack, it is a plot; if such labels are appended to the title, then they reflect the 
classification of the case. Moreover, the country or countries listed under the case’s title 
are those Member States that were directly affected by it. Lastly, the cumulative sources 
for the database and the cases counts more than 300 individual sources; presenting them 
 Many small-scale plots and networks are nameless, consequently some of these have been named after their 41
peculiarities because not every one of them have been given a name by the media, or the authorities.
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in the thesis’ body would require an incredibly high number of footnotes. Consequently 
they have been included in Appendix II categorized by case. 
In the following section of this chapter the 60 networks and the plots or attacks they were 
involved in are outlined, and categorized by network; for this reason a plot or an attack 
uncovered in, for example, 2013 has been categorized in a 2010 network . This is because 
certain networks operated through different years, such as the Cannes-Torcy Group, and 
in other instances it took the authorities several weeks, sometime months, to discern the 
network’s entirety, or as close to it as possible. For example, the failed attack on the Bonn 
train station at the end of 2012 resulted in the foiling of a plot targeting Pro-NRW 
politicians in March 2013 by members of the same network. In the former case of the 
Cannes-Torcy Group, a few members escaped to Syria following the executed attack on a 
Kosher grocery store and the uncovering of a second plot linked to the group. In 2014 
these persons returned from Syria, and were arrested for plotting attacks on the French 
Riviera; they had acquired TATP, guns, and more rudimentary improvised explosive 
devices, thus it was categorized as a foiled plot.  Snapshots and descriptions of the 42
individual 68 cases have been included in Annex I; in Annex I plots and attacks are 
categorized per year, and not by network. The following chapters will scrutinize the 
characteristics of the networks and the individuals jihadi terrorists comprising them. 
 Magnenet, Jean-Christopher. "20 Members of French Jihadist Cell That Attacked Jewish Grocery to Face Trial." 42
I24News, 13 Nov. 2015. Web. 11 Mar. 2016. <http://www.i24news.tv/en/news/international/europe/
92359-151113-20-members-of-french-jihadist-cell-that-attacked-jewish-grocery-to-face-trial>.
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2.1. European Jihadi Terror Networks, and Their Cases 2010-2015 
 2010 
• Rajib Karim:  
• British Airways Plot (UK - 25 February 2010). 
• Roshonara Choudhry:  
• Attempted Stabbing of British MP (UK - 14 May 2010) - Failed Attack. 
• Two Swedish-Kosovan Brothers:  
• Lars Vilks Attack (Sweden - 15 May 2010) - Failed Attack. 
• Mullah Krekar:  
• Plot to Kill Norwegian Politician, and to Incite Hatred (Norway - June 2010). 
• Lors Dukayev:  
• Jyllands-Posten Attack (Denmark, Belgium - 10 September 2010) - Failed Attack. 
• Network around Ahmed Siddiqui spreading across several member states:  
• 2010 ‘Mumbai-Style’ Terror Plot (UK, Germany, France, amongst others - 29 
September 2010). 
• Oslo Plot (Norway - July 8, 2010). 
• Hamdaoui Cell:  
• Plot to Attack Targets in Belgium and Recruit Jihadi Sympathizers (Belgium - 
November 2010). 
• Chechen connected with Imarat Kavkaz:  
• Plot to Blow-Up Train Carrying NATO Troops (Belgium, Austria - 2 December 
2010). 
• Unnamed network of two friends:  
• Stockholm Suicide Bombing (Sweden - 11 December 2010) - Executed Attack. 
• Unnamed network of three Swedes and one Tunisian:  
• 2010 Jyllands-Posten Plot (Sweden, Denmark - 29 December 2010). 
• Unnamed network of nine around Abdul Miah:  
• Plot to Blow Up the London Stock Exchange (UK - 29 December 2010). 
• Mohammed Geele:  
• Kurt Westergaard Axe Attack (Denmark - 31 December 2010). 
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 2011 
• Arid Uka:  
• Frankfurt Airport Shooting (Germany - 2 March 2011) - Executed Attack. 
• Al-Qaeda linked Dusseldorf Cell:  
• Plot to Set Off Explosives in Crowded Areas in Dusseldorf (Germany - April 201). 
• European al-Qaeda Cell:  
• Plot to Recruit Terror Cells for Attacks in the EU (Austria, Germany - May 2011). 
• Mohammed Sajid and Shasta Khan:  
• Plot to Attack Jewish Communities in Manchester (UK  - July 2011). 
• Al-Qaeda linked eleven-man Irfan Naseer Cell:  
• Birmingham’s Explosive Rucksacks Plot (UK - September 2011). 
 2012 
• Woman tied to Forsane Alizza:   43
• Plot to Incite Jihadi Terrorism in France (France - Spring 2012). 
• The Merah Brothers:  
• Toulouse & Montauban Shootings (France - 11–22 March 2012) - Executed Attack. 
• Mohamed Jarmoune:  
• Plot to Blow Up Synagogue in Milan (Italy - 15 March 2012). 
• Luton Cell:  
• Toy Car Plot (UK - 25 April 2012) - Foiled Attack. 
• The Warsame Brothers:  
• Danish ‘Terror Plot’ (Denmark - 29 May 2012). 
• Brahim Bahrir:  
• Attack on Belgian Police Officers (France, Belgium - 8 June 2012) - Executed Attack. 
• Unnamed network of six British of Pakistani and Bangladeshi descent: 
• English Defense League Plot (UK - 30 June 2012) - Failed Attack. 
• Network around Richard Dart:  
• Wootton Bassett Plot (UK - 5 July 2012). 
• Hossam Taleb Yaacoub:  
• Plot to Attack Israeli Tourist in Cyprus (Cyprus, Sweden - 7 July 2012). 
• Unnamed trio linked to Hezbollah:  
 Forsane Alizza (“Knights of Pride”) was an Islamist organization that would encourage its followers to travel, 43
train, and fight in Afghanistan and would provide logistic support for such travels. It operated between 2010 and 
February 2012, when it was officially banned.
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• 2012 Burgas Bus Bombing (Bulgaria - 18 July 2012) - Executed Attack. 
• Unnamed network of three:  
• Gibraltar Plot (UK - 1 August 2012). 
• Cannes-Torcy Group:  
• Attack on Kosher Grocery Store in Sarcelles (France - 19 September 2012) - 
Executed Attack  
• Plot to Attack Jewish Locations Throughout France (France - 6 October 2012). 
• Riviera Terror Plot (France - 17 February 2014) - Foiled Attack 
• CERN researcher linked to al-Qaeda:  
• The CERN Plot (France - 8 October 2009).  44
• Unnamed network of various nationalities:  
• Bonn Train Station Plot (Germany - 10 December 2012) - Failed Attack. 
• Anti-Pro-NRW Politicians (Germany - 13 March 2013) - Foiled Attack. 
 2013 
• Basil Hassan:  
• Attack on Lars Hedegaard (Denmark - 5 February 2013) - Failed Attack. 
• Mohammed Echaabi:  
• Echaabi Plot (Spain - 23 February 2013). 
• Marignane Network:  
• Plot to Attack High Profile Targets in France (France - 13 March 2013). 
• Unnamed network of five:  
• Plot to Attack Targets in Italy (Italy - 30 April 2013). 
• The Bookseller from Bronshoj:  
• Plot to Incite Jihadi Terrorism (Denmark - 14 May 2013). 
• Michael Adebolajo & Michael Adebowale:  
• Lee Rigby Attack (UK - 22 May 2013). - Executed Attack. 
• Alexandre Dhaussy:  
• La Défense Attack (France - 25 May 2013) - Executed Attack. 
• Anas El Abboubi:  
• Plot to Establish a Sharia4Italy Branch (Italy - 12 June 2013). 
• Lyes Darani:  
• Lyes Darani Plot (France - October 2013). 
 The CERN plot was included because, albeit the suspected perpetrator was arrested in 2009, he was detained for 44
almost three years until he was charged in 2012. He was eventually convicted under French anti-terrorism laws in 
2012 and sentenced to five years in prison.
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• Unnamed network of two:  
• London “Mumbai” Plot (UK - 13 October 2013). 
 2014 
• Unnamed network of three led by returnee foreign fighter:  
• Brussels Museum Shooting (Belgium, France - 24 May 2014) - Executed Attack. 
• Unnamed network of IS returnee:  
• Creteil Plot (France - 5 July 2014). 
• Brusthom Ziamani:  
• Ziamani Beheading Plot (UK - 19 August 2014) - Foiled Attack. 
• Dutch Jihadi Couple: 
• Plot to Attack the EU Commission (Belgium, Netherlands - September 2014). 
• Turnup Terror Squad:  
• Surgeon Plot (UK - 7 October 2014) - Foiled Attack. 
• Austrian Teenager:  
• Vienna Teenager Plot (Austria - October 2014). 
• Unnamed network of four Pakistani friends and cousins:  
• Remembrance Day Plot (UK - 6 November 2014) - Foiled Attack. 
• French lone-wolf of Burundian origins:  
• 2014 Tours Knife Attack (France - 20 December 2014) - Executed Attack. 
• French lone-wolf of Northern African origins:  
• 2014 Dijon Knife Attack (France - 21 December 2014) - Executed Attack. 
• French copy-cat lone-wolf:  
• 2014 Nantes Attack (France - 22 December 2014) - Executed Attack. 
 2015 
• Unnamed network of French home-grown jihadis:  
• Charlie Hebdo Attack (France - 7 January 2015) - Executed Attack. 
• Coulibaly Attack (France - 7 January 2015) - Executed Attack. 
• Network around Abdelhamid Abaaoud:  
• Verviers Plot (Belgium - 15 January 2015) - Foiled Attack. 
• French Church Plot  (France - 19 April 2015). 
• Thalys Train Attack (Belgium, France, Netherlands - 21 August 2015) - Foiled 
Attack. 
• November 2015 Paris Attack (France - 13 November 2015) - Executed Attack. 
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• Omar Abdel Hamid El-Hussein:  
• Copenhagen Shootings (Denmark - 14 February 2015) - Executed Attack. 
• Islamic Brotherhood for Jihad Predication:  
• Catalonia Plot (Spain - 8 April 2015). 
• The Terror Couple from Oberursel:  
• Plot to Attack the Frankfurt Bike Race (Germany - 29 April 2015) - Foiled Attack. 
• Unnamed UK Couple:  
• London Bombing 10th Anniversary Plot (UK - 28 May 2015) - Foiled Attack. 
• Yassine Salhi:  
• Lyon Gas Factory Attack (France - 26 June 2015) - Executed Attack. 
• Rafik Mohamad Yousef: 
• Berlin Knife Attack (Germany - 17 September 2015) - Executed Attack. 
• Hakim Marnissi:  
• Toulon Naval Base Plot (France - 29 October 2015) - Foiled Attack. 
2.2. Other Cases 
Besides the above-mentioned 68 cases, there are a number of possible jihadi terrorist 
incidents that have been excluded from this study. In primis, and in relation to most 
recent cases, certain individuals had to be excluded because it was not possible to discern 
the information’s authenticity, or whether they met the thesis’ criteria. For example, a 
number of Salah Abdeslam’s friends were arrested, and are currently being investigated 
for their role in the 2015 November Paris attack. Yet, it was not possible to include them 
in the dataset because it was not possible at the time of writing to determine whether they 
were motivated by a jihadi ideology, or whether they were knowingly helping a friend 
unknowingly of his wrongdoings. Similarly, other cases had to be excluded simply 
because there was not enough information, especially when dealing with small-scale 
plots, or because the target of the attack, or terrorist act, was outside of the EU. This is 
the case of people trying to travel to Syria, but whom had not plotted on EU soil, and of 
the Sharia4Belgium affiliates on trial at the time of writing. Consequently, this list 
presents only a detailed impression of jihadi terrorists in Europe; there are a number of 
plots and attacks that could not be included, for example those persons being prosecuted 
upon their return to a EU country for their role in the Syrian conflict. Ulteriorly, there are 
a number of cases in which a plot was foiled, yet no convictions were handed or only a 
few of the network’s members were put on trial; for example a few of the suspected 
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plotters of attacking Jewish targets across France, and the funder of the Coulibaly attack 
are believed to be fighting in Syria amongst IS ranks. 
The following chapter will analyze the different characteristics of the 60 networks behind 
the 68 cases of jihadi terrorism in Europe between 2010 and 2015. 
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3. Characteristics of Jihadi Terrorist Networks 
In this chapter the thesis seeks to answer its first research question, namely: what are the 
characteristics of the networks behind jihadi terror plots and attacks in Europe between 
2010-2015? Yet, given the nature of the thesis’ open sources, it was not possible to 
uncover all the information pertaining to every network, and scrutinize these according to 
Bakker and Sageman’s variables. Consequently, in this chapter the analysis will limit 
itself to some general traits and observations of the networks on which it was possible to 
uncover a substantial amount of information, corresponding roughly to two-thirds of the 
network, and of the variables that are consistent in at least two rough thirds of the sample. 
The subsequent two chapters will explore these in detail by scrutinizing the cumulative 
biographies of the 161 persons involved in jihadi terrorism in Europe between 2010 and 
2015.   
3.1. General Traits 
Upon looking at the jihadi terror networks active in Europe for this time period, a diverse 
picture emerges in terms of numbers and size. Some are made-up by a lone-wolf attacker, 
whilst others are much more numerous; the largest European network comprised in this 
thesis includes almost 20 persons and is wrapped around one individual, Abdelhamid 
Abaaoud. The countries with the most networks active on their territory in this time 
period are France (23 networks), the United Kingdom (16 networks), followed by 
Belgium and Germany with eight networks each. The networks differ also in the degree 
to which they managed to mature their plan, with the apex being its execution. Between 
2010 and 2015 at a Union level 32 plots were uncovered while jihadis were elaborating 
their projects; eleven attacks were foiled by the authorities as the terrorist were in 
proximity of executing their plots; while seven attacks failed due to shortcomings by the 
jihadis; and sadly, 18 attacks reached their execution phase. In sum, they total 68 cases of 
jihadi terrorism. 
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 In terms of what years the terrorists managed to execute their plans the most without 
failing, in 2015 they managed to do so six times, in 2014 and 2012 four times each. 
Conversely, the authorities managed to put an end to their plans in primordial stages the 
most in 2010 and 2012, sweeping in on eight plots each, followed by 2013 (seven plots); 
ulteriorly, they foiled five plots in 2015 and four in 2014. Lastly, in 2010 terrorists 
reached the execution phase once, yet failed in four cases to reach their intended plan’s 
complexity, and they also failed to do so in two cases in 2012, and in one case in 2013. In 
2011, 2014, and 2015 jihadi terrorists were either able to reach the execution phase of 
their plan without failing, or they were caught by the authorities. 
Although to give a fair assessment of the authorities’ preventive measures would be 
beyond the objectives of this thesis and not possible to do so via open sources, it is worth 
to mention the years in which the most jihadi cases were uncovered by the authorities 
available to the public. Consequently, the most favorable years for law enforcement are 
2012, with nine cases (eight plots, one foiled attack), followed by 2013 (seven plots and 
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Figure 2: EU Jihadi Terror Plots, Foiled, Failed, and Executed Attacks (2010-2015).
one foiled attack) and 2010 (all plots) with eight cases each. An overview tally of plots, 
foiled, failed, and executed attacks per year is presented in table 1.  
In regards to the objectives of the terrorist operations, they primarily choose high-profile 
and public targets, such as in the 13 cases in which landmarks were chosen or the 12 in 
which a high-profile individual was targeted. In the case of the latter dozen, individuals 
such as anti-Islam critic Lars Hedegaard, who was attacked in 2013, and cartoonist Lars 
Vilks, who was the target of attacks in 2010 and in 2015, were designated, as well as 
more ‘traditionaly’ high-profile individuals like politicians and entities representing the 
state, such as cops and soldiers. Landmarks selected include the European Commission in 
2014, the London Stock Exchange in 2010, and several journalistic and satirical 
publications such as Charlie Hebdo in France and Jyllands-Posten in Denmark, amongst 
others. Moreover, there were at least eleven cases in which the cell’s objective included 
inciting hatred between communities; examples of cases with such finality include the 
attack on a Kosher Grocery Store in 2012 in Sarcelles (France), and a failed attack on 
English Defense League supporters. Cases such as the latest mentioned have been 
included in this category because of the subsequent repercussions the terrorists were 
aiming at triggering; in the latter example, in notes left by the would-be perpetrators in 
car brought to light how they were hoping to incite a reaction by the far-right group.  In 45
Table 1: European Cases of Jihadi Terrorism Per Year (2010-2015).
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Plot 8 4 8 7 2 2
Foiled Attack 0 0 1 1 4 5
Failed Attack 4 0 2 1 0 0
Executed Attack 1 1 4 2 4 6
 Jackson, Andrew. "Plot to Attack Dewsbury EDL Rally Failed as Terrorists Turned Up Late - Then Had Car 45
Impounded on Way Home.” The Huddersfield Examiner. 30 Apr. 2013. Web. 20 May 2016. <http://
www.examiner.co.uk/news/west-yorkshire-news/plot-attack-dewsbury-edl-rally-4930357>.
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fact, oftentimes jihadi attacks are followed by Islamophobic backlashes, as was the case 
with the Charlie Hebdo attack.  46
Notably, between 2010 and 2015 there were very few cases involving methods of 
transportation such as trains and busses, or transportation locations such as airports and 
train stations. Furthermore, since 2012 there were no cases involving such targets, with 
the exception of two foiled attacks in 2015. Targets in this period are focused on public 
spaces or with the finality or sub-finality of inciting hatred. Moreover, terrorists in this 
second decade still rely on fire arms of different calibers and automaticity, TATP, and 
more rudimentary improvised explosive devices such as those composed of shrapnel. 
3.2. Homogenous Networks? 
In this section of chapter three the thesis will scrutinize the networks to ascertain whether 
the characteristics are homogenous within the networks, and if there are any stark 
differences or similarities between networks. It will do so by availing itself of Bakker and 
Sageman’s variables for which enough information pertaining to the variable and network 
in question could be found. As mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, there has to 
be, roughly, two-thirds of a variable or network’s data for either to come under scrutiny. 
Age, gender, faith, and prior criminal record are the four variables that are most 
homogenous within networks. It was possible to ascertain these for 31 of the 60 networks 
scrutinized by the thesis. Consequently, the oldest network operating between 2010 and 
2015 is around 36 years of age, while the youngest network is 20 years old; these are 
respectively an unnamed network of five that plotted to attack targets in Italy in 2013, 
and two Swedish-Kosovan brothers responsible for the failed attack on Lars Vilks in 
2010. In terms of age gap, the largest difference present is in the Islamic Brotherhood for 
 Harris, Chris. "Islamophobic Attacks Rocket by 500% Since Charlie Hebdo Murders." Euronews, 16 Apr. 2015. 46
Web. 20 May 2016. <http://www.euronews.com/2015/04/16/islamophobic-attacks-in-france-rocket-by-500-percent-
since-charlie-hebdo-murders/>.
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Jihad Predication network, 28 years of difference, and an unnamed network of two 
plotting a “Mumbai” attack in London in 2013. The couple was 25 years of age. 
In terms of faith, of the networks on which this information could be found for the time 
leading up to their arrests or attacks shows a picture of variegated religious backgrounds 
with a common pattern of increased faith. Some of the networks, such as the Cannes-
Torcy Group and the Abebowale brothers, converted to Islam shortly prior to their first 
jihadi undertaking, as certain networks are implicated in multiple cases. Other networks, 
such as the Turnup Terror Squad, are made up of members that were raised Catholic, and 
subsequently converted, along with individuals who were brought up Muslim and 
radicalized shortly before joining the network on their own, or were brought in by a 
friend who was a member already. Similarly, this is also the case of the unnamed network 
of home-grown jihadis behind the Coulibaly and Charlie Hebdo attacks; the Kouachi 
brothers were reportedly brought up secular, and, along with a third, were indoctrinated 
and radicalized while in prison.  47
In terms of prior criminal records, the networks’ members on which a criminal record 
could be found present a homogenous picture. Some of the networks were formed in 
prison, such as the aforementioned one responsible for the Charlie Hebdo and Coulibaly 
attacks, whilst in the cases of single-person networks the time spent behind bars served to 
radicalize them, and in certain instances to put them in contact with official networks. 
This holds true for parts of the network around Abdelhamid Abaaoud; a few members 
met the ring-leader while serving time in prison. This is the case, for example, of Ibrahim 
Abdeslam, who subsequently recruited his younger brother, Salah. Also, individuals with 
a criminal background were responsible in recruiting friends without a prior criminal 
record; three networks fit this scenario. 
 Chrisafis, Angelique. "Charlie Hebdo Attackers: Born, Raised and Radicalised in Paris." The Guardian. Guardian 47
News and Media, 12 Jan. 2015. Web. 20 May 2016. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/12/-sp-charlie-
hebdo-attackers-kids-france-radicalised-paris>.
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The level of education is also pretty homogenous within networks, although this is not 
surprising considering the vast majority of the persons’ whose biographies could be 
tailored completed a secondary form of education. Yet, it was not possible to discern this 
information for enough networks to make a thorough between-networks comparison. 
Nevertheless there is one feature pertaining to within network characteristics worth 
mentioning in regards to education. In a few networks there was a mixture between 
individuals with a higher form of education and those with a secondary form; notably the 
ringleaders in these cases had a higher education. These are the cases of the British 
couple that plotted a London Bombing 10th Anniversary attack; a Stockholm suicide 
bombing plot; a London ‘Mumbai’ plot by two friends; the husband of the Terror Couple 
from Oberusel; Irfan Naseer in regards to his cell; and a few of the leading individuals of 
the al-Qaeda-linked Dusseldorf cell. 
Generally, most networks were recruited in their country of residence. In fact, most of the 
persons that resided in a Member State and were raised in the same country were 
subsequently recruited in the same country as well. There are a few exceptions though, 
such as the afore mentioned members of the Cannes-Torcy Group that were planning to 
attack Jewish targets across France; the perpetrator of the Berlin Knife Attack Rafik 
Mohamad Yousef, who was recruited in Iraq; the homeless attacker of the Thalys train in 
2015, who was raised in Morocco; and members of Abaaoud’s network, amongst others. 
In regards to the Southern French jihadi group, almost half were recruited in Egypt, while 
the rest became part of the network in France; all had at least French citizenship, and a 
few held a second passport. In the context of Abaaoud’s network, a few of the members 
of his network were recruited in Belgium despite they resided in France. 
Most groups are homogenous in terms of nationalities held by those comprising them, 
such as Irfan Naseer’s eleven man cell (almost all had UK passports), or the Luton cell, 
comprised of four Brits, three of which were of Pakistani origin. When looking at the 
networks in terms of the dominating country of origin, a diverse picture emerges. In 
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networks in which social affiliations played a role there is a higher level of homogeneity 
in terms of country of origin, when family members are involved in the same network, 
and region, when friends are involved in the same network. Networks in which social 
affiliation did not play a role are much more diverse. Examples of these include the cases 
of the afore mentioned Cannes-Torcy Group, whose individuals hailed from Algeria, 
Tunisia, Congo, and the Caribbean; and the networks around Ahmed Siddiqui. This eight 
person network’s origins spanned eight different countries. 
Notably, 19 networks involved a social affiliation who either participated in the attack, as 
did the Abdeslam brothers, or conspired together to perpetrate jihadi terrorism, as did the 
terror couple from Oberursel. In regards to couples, four networks were exclusively 
composed of married couples, whilst a fifth was composed 50% by a married couple. As 
briefly mentioned, friends also played a contributing role in radicalizing peers, and 
contributing to the formation of networks and the hatching of plots. For example, in 2014 
Tarik Hassan recruited his best childhood friend to join his ‘Turnup Terror Squad’ with 
the finality of being his driver on a moped whilst he shot innocent bystanders. 
Fortunately his plans were foiled by the authorities. Lastly, the kinship link most 
frequently implicated in jihadi terror plots are brother-lines; in ten networks they were 
present. These include pairs of brothers that acted alone forming their own cells, such as 
the Warsame and the Merah brothers, or others that were members of a broader network, 
as were the Ali brothers, part of Irfan Naseer's cell. Notably, one of the member’s brother 
of the failed attack on English Defense League supporters was involved in a different 
jihadi terror plot; he was part of Irfan Naseer’s cell.  In the case of individuals who acted 48
alone, such as Hakim Marnissi whose attack on the Toulon naval base was foiled, the 
ideological support of a friend fighting in Syria, who maintained contact throughout the 
planning phase, played a determinant role in keeping the person on track towards his 
intended objective.  
 These are Anzal and Ishaaq Hussain, the latter was a member of Irfan Naseer’s cell, and the former was part of the 48
failed attack on English Defense League supporters.
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Besides social affiliations, official jihadi terror networks played a role in the formation of 
jihadi networks and plots in Europe. Between 2010-2015 at least 10 of the networks 
behind jihadi terror plots and attacks had some form of connection to an official jihadi 
terror network, such as Ahmed Siddiqui’s connection to al-Qaeda, or Abdelhamid 
Abaaoud’s connection to the Islamic State. These are cases in which the official terror 
organizations served as more than mere ‘inspirational’ figures for the would-be terrorists’ 
acts, rather without their role in the case such case would not have taken place. This is 
what the thesis ascribes to forms of connection to official jihadi terror networks. The 
most active for this period being al-Quaeda (six affiliated networks, and an ulterior one to 
its offshoot AQAP), and the Islamic State with two networks. Notably, more than half of 
the cases in 2011 have an official terror link, the others consist of a lone-wolf attacker 
and a self-recruited couple in Manchester. Furthermore, there is also a high degree of 
homogeneity in regards to whether networks attended a foreign jihadi training camp, such 
as those administered by al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, and by IS in Syria. This is the case of 
at least 16 networks on which information could be found. For example, more than half 
of the Cannes-Torcy Group trained in Syria; two thirds of the Luton Cell was trained in 
Pakistan; 12 the network around Abdelhamid Abaaoud trained in Syria; amongst others. 
Moreover, in a few cases there is an inspirational role played between networks and their 
cases within the European jihadi context. The Cannes-Torcy Group behind the foiled 
2014 Riviera Terror Plot were inspired by the Boston Marathon Bomber; in 2014 Ziamani 
was inspired by the attack on Lee Rigby the year prior; and so were the Remembrance 
Day plotters the same year. Also, the December 2014 attacker of bystanders in Nantes 
was reportedly a copycat incident of an attack in Dijon the day prior. Ulteriorly, certain 
foiled attacks were aimed at ‘commemorating’, albeit in a sick manner, attacks executed 
in the past, such as the 7/7 bombings. This is the case of a couple who was arrested in 
May 2015 while being in their final stages of completing a bomb; in a-like manner to the 
2005 terrorists, their intended objective was a subway. 
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For the time period between 2010 and 2015, prisons and mosques played contributing 
roles in the formation of ten networks. In the case of the Charlie Hebdo attack, the 
Kouachi brothers formed a network with Amedy Coulibaly and his wife, and coordinated 
their attacks in the beginning of 2015 after meeting in prison years prior. Moreover, at 
least eight of these were comprised of individuals who partook in a foreign conflict. 
3.3. Conclusion 
In this third chapter, the thesis sought to answer its thirds research question, namely what 
are the characteristics of jihadi terror networks behind jihadi terror plots and attacks in 
Europe between 2010 and 2015. It did so by bringing them under scrutiny of Bakker and 
Sageman’s variables, but, as afore mentioned, only those of which enough information 
could be found per variable and per network. Consequently, it was possible to investigate 
the networks’ according to ten of the 18 variables. The variables that could not be 
analyzed per network are: socioeconomic background; occupation; psychological 
explanations; employment; and relative deprivation. 
The networks differ between one another in terms of countries in which they operated, 
their sizes and ages, the targets they chose and the extent to which they came close to 
achieving their plans. In fact, in this time period 32 plots were uncovered, eleven attacks 
were foiled, seven failed due to shortcoming by the jihadis, and 18 attacks were executed; 
the two countries in which they were active the most are France (23) and the United 
Kingdom (16). Notably, in 2014 and 2015 terrorist were either able to reach the execution 
phase of their plans, or were foiled by the authorities; none failed. This could be 
indicative of a growing execution-ability of jihadi terrorists, but more research on the 
topic is warranted to draw such conclusion here. Moreover, the networks varied in size 
from one individual to almost 20, and they primarily chose high-profile and public 
targets. Transposition means and their locations have been a decrescendo target 
throughout the decade, with only two foiled attacks in 2015 that can be counted against 
these since 2012. 
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In terms of within network homogeneity, age, gender, prior criminal record, and faith are 
the four variables that are most homogenous. The oldest network is around 36 years of 
age, and the youngest is 20 years old. Information regarding the networks’ faith in the 
time leading up to jihad shows a variegated picture. Within network, there are common 
patterns of increased faith amongst members, and time spent behind bars. In fact, prisons, 
along with mosques, contributed to the formation of ten networks and the radicalization 
of their members. Social affiliations and official jihadi terror networks also played a role 
in forming networks. Regarding the latter, at least 16 networks attended a foreign terrorist 
training camp, to which the majority of the network was present, and at least ten 
networks had some form of connection to an official jihadi group. Notably, in 2011 more 
than half of the cases had an official terror link. Regarding the former, at least 19 
networks involved some form of social affiliation, with the kinship link most-implicated 
running along brother-lines, and four networks were notably composed exclusively of 
married couples. 
In regards to the interplay between official jihadi groups and the networks operating in 
Europe, it is worth mentioning the ‘inspirational’ role of cases. A few networks were 
inspired by earlier attacks, such as the Cannes-Torcy Group, inspired by the Boston 
Marathon Bomber. 
Networks are also pretty homogenous in terms of recruitment. In fact, most of the persons 
that resided in a Member State and were raised in the same country were subsequently 
recruited in the same country as well. Most networks are also homogenous in terms of 
nationalities held by those comprising them, but they are less so when looking at the 
within-network dominating country of origin. Networks in which social affiliations did 
not play a role are much more diverse, as compared to networks in which family 
members and friends were members; in the case of the former, country of origin tend to 
coincide, while in the latter the region of the origin country tends to coincide. 
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Lastly, the within network level of education is pretty homogenous, and in a few 
networks there was a mixture between individuals with a higher degree and persons with 
a secondary education. Typically, the ones with the better education were the alleged or 
confirmed ringleaders. In the following chapter the characteristics of the individual 
terrorists will be analyzed. 
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4. Characteristics of Jihadi Terrorists in Europe 2010-2015 
Between 2010 and 2015 at least 161 persons and 60 networks were implicated in the 68 
jihadi terrorism cases in the European Union. This includes individuals currently on trial, 
that have been imprisoned, or that are deceased by their own will, such as those who 
committed suicide during or after an attack or due to the authorities’ intervention, while 
others have died fighting abroad subsequent to their fleeing. In the previous chapter the 
thesis scrutinized the networks behind these cases, analyzing their general traits and their 
main characteristics, yet its second research question remains of who are the individual 
jihadi terrorists behind these plots and attacks between 2010-2015. Chapter four seeks to 
answer this question, and deepen chapter three’s analysis by investigating the 161 
biographies, and analyzing them in light of Bakker and Sageman’s almost 20 variables 
relating to their social and psychological background, and the circumstances under which 
they joined the jihad. Subsequently, in order to gain an understanding of the 
characteristics of European jihadi terrorists for the 21st century, and to answer the thesis’ 
third research question, this chapter’s findings will be cross-compared with those reached 
by Bakker for the prior decade in the chapter five. 
4.1. Gender 
Conventional wisdom has it that jihadi terrorists are typically male; the thesis’ sample 
confirms this notion. Of the 161 persons implicated in the cases in question all but ten 
persons were male, corresponding to 6.21% of the sample. Nevertheless, this may be due 
to the criteria chosen for the research, and thus subject to change in the future. For 
example, the methodological decision to include plots and attacks whose targets were 
inside the EU could have drastically changed this, especially in light of the Islamic 
State’s fatwas to establish a caliphate. In fact, when looking at the gender ratio of foreign 
fighters, the percentage of women is much higher, standing at 17%.  49
 Van Ginkel, B., and E. Entenmann (Eds.), “The Foreign Fighters Phenomenon in the European Union. Profiles, 49
Threats & Policies”, The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague 7, no. 2 (2016).
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4.2. Geographical Background 
There are several ways one can determine the geographical background of a person. This 
thesis, following Bakker’s prior work, avails itself of four criteria: the family origin; the 
country in which they were raised; the place of residence; and by nationality. When 
looking at family origin, the bulk does not come from Europe, and are either first, second 
or third generation migrants. In four instances they did originate from Member States, 
and are from a mix marriage, as in the case of the Swedish-Egyptian attacker of Jyllands-
Posten, or are from the United Kingdom, France, or Germany. The region from which 
most of the sample’s persons originate is Northern Africa, in particular Morocco (18), 
Algeria (14) and Tunisia (7). Other typical countries of origin include Pakistan (14), 
Bangladesh (12), and Turkey (9). 
Moreover, regarding the group of second and third generation non-European individuals 
in the dataset, albeit only four are of European origin, 77 persons were raised in Europe 
out of the 89 jihadis whose upbringing could be found.  This is almost half (47.82%) of 50
this thesis’ sample. The two most frequent countries of upbringing were the UK (33), and 
France (20). 
Upon looking at the place of residence of the various jihadi terrorists comprised in the 
dataset, the overwhelming majority was residing in Europe at the time of their arrests, or 
when they executed their attacks. Of the 148 persons’ whose residence could be found, 
139 resided in a Member State, with the most resided countries being the UK (51), 
France (24), and Germany (17). 
When looking at the fourth criterion, nationality, a few are more prominent than others. 
Of the 154 persons whose nationality could be found, around 22% (34 persons) held dual 
nationalities, whilst the rest held a single nationality. The most prominent individual 
 Some jihadis migrated to Europe at a very young age. Following the antecedent publications this thesis builds 50
upon, those who migrated after the age of ten are considered to have been raised in the country of origin.
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nationalities are from the UK (40), and France (27). Of those persons originating outside 
of the EU, but who hold a EU passport as well, Morocco (11), Algeria (7), and Tunisia (7) 
rank highest; this is not surprising, giving the most common area of origin is North 
Africa.  
As a whole, the geographical background of those jihadis comprised in the dataset is very 
diverse. In total, these individuals held at least 26 different passports and derived from 31 
distinct countries of origin. Conversely, the countries of residence is much less diverse, 
spanning across 17 different states. 
4.3. Socioeconomic Background 
In regards to the socioeconomic background of the persons included in the thesis’ dataset, 
the categorization followed was that applied by Bakker, and previously by Sageman. 
Consequently, a person’s employment, or lack-there-of, has been categorized as ‘lower’, 
‘middle’, and ‘upper’ class. This was an inherently subjective exercise, necessitating 
crude judgement due to the limited amount of information on the socioeconomic status of 
these individuals, and the ups and downs of their financial situation. The measurement 
taken for classification purposes is the dominant occupational background of a person 
and his or her family, and in the case of minors living with their parents the latter’s 
occupation was taken: “i.e. unskilled worker is lower class; semi-skilled worker is middle 
class, and; high-skilled worker is upper class. Depending on the type of business, 
entrepreneurs are classified as middle or upper class: i.e. a shopkeeper versus someone 
managing a large company.”   51
Of the thesis’ 161 individuals, information on the socioeconomic background was found 
on 56 persons. The predominant social class being the ‘lower’, with 26 people; followed 
by ‘middle’, with 12 individuals; and lastly ‘higher’, with merely three persons.  
 Bakker, Edwin. “Jihadi Terrorists in Europe: Their Characteristics and the Circumstances in Which They Joined 51
the Jihad: an Exploratory Study.” Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, Dec. 2006. Pg. 38. 
Web.
!  of !45 73
4.4. Education 
Despite the numerous media reports on the jihadi cases, and the legal proceedings 
detailing characteristics of the individuals, it was possible to find information on 47 
persons’ educational background. These have been classified as either ‘primary’, 
‘secondary’, or ‘higher’ in line with the previous work by Bakker. As a measurement of 
the variable in question, the highest level of education completed by the person was 
taken. For example, in the case of a current college/university student, or a former one 
who did not complete university-level studies, s/he will be classified as having completed 
‘secondary’ education, and not a ‘higher’ education. Consequently, the vast majority of 
the sample, 45 persons, completed at least secondary education, with 13 having 
completed a higher educational program at a university or college. Two persons only 
completed primary school. Yet, it has to be mentioned that a considerable fraction of the 
sample on which information could not be found they could have not completed a form 
of higher education, being 20 years of age or younger, accounting for 13 people, with 
some being as young as 14 and 17. Furthermore, there are a few cases in which the level 
of education could not be discerned, yet their employment indicates that there is a strong 
possibility a form of higher education, and at least secondary could have been completed. 
For example, a hairdresser had to receive vocational training, as an imam and a 
construction engineer; these, for accuracy have not been factored in the afore mentioned 
‘primary’, ‘secondary’ or ‘higher’ groupings. 
4.5. Faith as Youth 
It was possible to find information on the childhood faith of 52 persons comprised in the 
dataset. 23 of these grew up in Muslim practicing families, and developed jihadi views in 
the period leading up to their arrests or plot execution. For example, this is the case of a 
few members of the network behind the foiled Remembrance Day attack in 2014.  52
 McLelland, Euan. "Man Accused of Plotting Lee Rigby-Style Execution on Remembrance Day Says He Was 52
Buying Kitchen Knife 'As a Gift for His Mother'" Mail Online. Associated Newspapers, 04 Nov. 2015. Web. 20 May 
2016. <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3303041/Man-accused-plotting-Lee-Rigby-style-execution-
Remembrance-Day-says-buying-kitchen-knife-gift-mother.html>.
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Moreover, 17 of the 52 people were brought up a religion different from Islam, five were 
brought up in a secular household and converted at some point in life; this could have 
been on a personal whim, or due to a life-event such as marriage. This was the case of the 
hairdresser ringleader of the Islamic Brotherhood for Jihad Predication.  Lastly, seven 53
persons were brought up in a non-practicing Muslim family, as was the case of the the 
Abdeslam brothers who were notorious for running a hash-smoking bar, were not shy at 
drinking alcohol either.  54
4.6. Occupation 
The ‘occupation’ variable has been operationalized following Bakker and Sageman, 
resulting in six classifications: ‘unskilled’, ‘semi-skilled’, ‘skilled’, ‘entrepreneurs’, 
‘student’, and ‘unemployed’. Unskilled workers include cleaners, shop employees and 
drivers; examples of semi-skilled workers are chefs, clerics, and electricians; and lastly, 
highly skilled workers include engineers, doctors and scientists, amongst others. 
Consequently, it was possible to find the occupational background of 58 persons 
comprised in the dataset. The majority at the time of their arrests, or jihadi undertaking, 
were unskilled workers, 20 persons, ten were semi-skilled workers, and three persons 
were highly skilled workers. Ulteriorly, there are six students and five entrepreneurs in 
the sample; these include a bar owner, and two business owners. Lastly, 24.14% of this 
sample was unemployed at their time of arrest or attack. 
When comparing the thesis’ sample with the Union’s average trends for the same time 
period, the latter demonstrates a much lower unemployment rate fluctuating below and 
 Kern, Soeren. "Spain: Barcelona's Would-Be Beheaders." Gatestone Institute, 25 Apr. 2015. Web. 20 May 2016. 53
<http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/5602/spain-beheadings>.
 Cottee, Simon. "Europe’s Joint-Smoking, Gay-Club Hopping Terrorists." Foreign Policy, 13 Apr. 2016. Web. 20 54
May 2016. <http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/04/13/the-joint-smoking-gay-club-hopping-terrorists-of-molenbeek-
a b d e s l a m - r a d i c a l i z a t i o n / ?
utm_content=buffer6c70d&utm_medium=social&utm_source=facebook.com&utm_campaign=buffer>.
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above 10% for the 2010-2015 period.  Yet, the percentage of low-skilled workers in the 55
thesis’ sample (34.5%) is lower than the EU’s average, fluctuating between 43-45%.  56
Consequently, the thesis’ data supports the notion that jihadi terrorists are typically 
unemployed or hold a low-skilled job; this combined group constitutes 34 out of the 58 
persons on which data could be found. Moreover, when looking at the unemployed jihadi 
terrorists under the age of 25, the sample’s average is much higher than the EU-level 
average; the latter fluctuating between 21 and 23.5,  whilst the former stands at 50%. 57
Furthermore, when looking at the persons whose data could not be found, at least ten 
persons were under the age of 19 at the time of arrests, strongly suggesting the 
unemployment subgroup could be larger than what is recorded in the thesis. Nevertheless, 
it is possible that these numbers are simply reflective of the overall situation of Muslims 
in Europe; they are less likely to be employed that non-Muslim Europeans.  58
4.7. Family Status 
Of the 161 jihadi terrorists comprised in the dataset, it was possible to find information 
pertaining to 55 persons’ family status. 42 persons were married at the time they were 
arrested or undertook violent jihad; of these, 19 also had children. Four persons were 
divorced, and three of these had children from their previous marriage.  Albeit it was 59
possible to only discern the family status of nine single individuals, there are reasons to 
suggest this number may be in fact higher. Firstly, there are a number of jihadis of a very 
young age -some as young as 17 and 14- meaning they were possibly too young to marry, 
be engaged, or have children. Secondly, in many reports when the individual is single it is 
 "Unemployment Statistics." Eurostat, Mar. 2016. Web. 20 May 2016. <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-55
explained/index.php/Unemployment_statistics>.
 "Labour Market and Wage Development in Europe 2015." European Commission, 17 July 2015. P. 156. Web. 20 56
May 2016. <http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=14290&langId=en>.
 Ibid.57
 Connor, Philip, and Matthias Koenig. "Explaining the Muslim Employment Gap in Western Europe: Individual-58
Level Effects and Ethno-Religious Penalties." Social Science Research 49 (2015): 191-201. Social Science 
Research, 17 Jan. 2015. Web. 20 May 2016.
 These numbers also include persons who married religiously and not in front of the state, as many chose to do so 59
because they refuse to recognize the authority of a secular government.
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not often stated, which is not the case with parents, finances, and spouses. Consequently, 
it is hard to support or challenge the notion that jihadis are typically single. 
4.8. Criminal Record 
Of the persons comprised in our sample, at least 40 had a criminal record when they got 
involved in their most recent jihadi endeavor. This means that at least almost a quarter 
(24.8%) of individuals behind jihadi terror plots and attacks between 2010-2015 had a 
prior criminal record. The prior offenses range from petty crime, such as drug dealing, to 
terror offenses. 
4.9. Psychological Explanations 
Upon scrutinizing the biographies of the jihadi terrorists, 19 suffered from either a form 
of mental illness, had a troubled upbringing, or experienced a crisis in the period leading 
up to the event. Of these, ten had a mental illness such as PTSD and schizophrenia, 
amongst others; five had a troubled upbringing, including two orphans; and four 
experienced a crisis in the period leading up to the event. This last sub-categorization was 
inserted because in two of these instances the jihadi endeavor was directed towards 
whom the perpetrator perceived at being at fault. For example, Yassine Salhi attacked the 
Lyon gas factory following a dispute with his (former) boss. Yet, considering that of the 
jihadis on whom information could not be found 20 are confirmed dead by police or by 
suicide, three are in Syria, and five have since been released, it was not possible to find 
their psychological information via public sources. As mentioned in the first chapter, 
once the public looses interest in a case, or once the matter is considered ‘resolved’, 
independently of the status of the terrorist, public sources become rapidly scarce. 
The sample’s 19 persons that either suffered from a psychological illness, or that had a 
troubled upbringing, or that experienced a crisis in the period leading up to their arrests, 
or involvement in jihadi activity is equivalent to 11.8% of the overall sample. This is 
considerably lower than the  World Health Organization’s (WHO) estimate of European 
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adults that suffered from a mental disease in 2015, standing at 27%.   Consequently, 60 61
based on the thesis’ sample, the myth claiming jihadis to be mentally unstable persons 
cannot be supported.   
4.10.Age 
Throughout the research period it was possible to uncover the dates of birth of 148 jihadis 
from the sample of 161 persons. The average age between 2010 and 2015 is 27.05, with a 
minimum and a maximum age of 14 and 55, and a standard deviation slightly above 
seven, at 7.18. 
4.11.Place of Recruitment 
It was possible to find information on the place of recruitment of 123 jihadis. Of these, 
106 were recruited while living in the EU, specifically in their country of residence at the 
time. Among these countries the United Kingdom (45) ranks first, followed by France 
(18), and Germany (14). Ulteriorly, nine persons were recruited in Belgium whilst only 
four resided there at the time. Conversely, only ten persons were recruited in a non-EU 
country while residing in a Member State; outside of the Union, persons were recruited 
most often in Lebanon (3), Turkey (3), and Egypt (2). Notably, in at least 21 cases jihadi 
propaganda played a radicalizing effect; 19 people were recruited at a mosque; nine 
persons from prisons and parks each; and five were recruited at their university. 
4.12.Faith 
In regards to the faith of persons at the time of their jihadi undertaking, it was possible to 
find this information on 49 persons. Not surprisingly, 23 persons either converted to 
Islam, were radicalized and recruited shortly before the plot or attack they undertook. 
 "Data and Statistics: Prevalence of Mental Disorders." World Health Organization, 2016. Web. 16 May 2016. 60
<http://www.euro.who.int/en/health-topics/noncommunicable-diseases/mental-health/data-and-statistics>.
 This statistic, according to the WHO, is based on a systematic review of data and statistics from community 61
studies of European Union countries, Iceland, and Norway. The adult population was defined as aged 18-65, and the 
series of mental disorders include problems arising from substance use, psychoses, depression, anxiety, and eating 
disorders. 
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Moreover, 26 persons manifested an increase in faith in the period leading up to their 
case; 19 were practicing Muslims, and seven were not. This change in personal views 
manifested itself in different forms in the biographies; these included the increase use of 
online forums associated with jihad, conjunct with an increase polarized views of religion 
and society; or by changing mosques in the favor of one with a more radical view as 
compared to the current one; or by undertaking a foreign jihadi training camp. 
4.13.Employment 
Unfortunately, it was quite rare to find the full-time versus part-time information of the 
persons in the sample. Consequently, it was possible to discern this by extrapolating 
information from data on the occupational situation of the individuals. Almost 70% of the 
sample had a full-time job (36 out of 52), 14 persons were unemployed, and only two 
held a part-time job. 
4.14.Relative Deprivation 
According to Sageman, relative deprivation is the idea that temporary (short-term) or 
structural (long-term) situations in which an individual experiences frustration eventually 
transmutes into aggression, pushing him/her, in the thesis’ context, to undertake jihadi 
terrorism. To this person jihadi terrorism is a way to right a perceived injustice that in 
their perspective is unwarranted, and thus needs to be rectified in somewhat-way. The 
idea of relative deprivation extends to both material and more spiritual aspects of life. In 
fact, “just before embarking on the process of joining, the future mujahedin suffered from 
social isolation, spiritual emptiness (the impetus for their increase in devotion), and 
underemployment.”  Yet, relative deprivation theory suffers of the fundamental problem 62
of specificity; not everyone who is underemployed or accrues a new faith undertakes 
jihadi terrorism. Hence, “relative deprivation would certainly increase the pool of 
potential mujahedin, but it cannot by itself explain the association with jihad.”  63
 Sageman, Marc. Understanding Terror Networks. Philadelphia: U of Pennsylvania, 2004. Pg. 95. Print.62
 Ibid.63
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Nevertheless it was chosen as a variable in the previous studies because it is “probably a 
necessary condition,” as people who are generally satisfied with their standard of life are 
unlikely to join revivalist terrorist movements.  64
Consequently, cases in which relative deprivation played a role have been identified in 
the following manner: in which a person(s) received a higher (tertiary) education, yet was 
unemployed or underemployed right before the undertaking of jihad or for a protracted 
period of time; in which the person(s) experienced a crisis or an event that may lead to 
the feeling of relative deprivation, such as becoming homeless or getting fired; and in 
which persons experienced spiritual emptiness followed by an impetus for increase in 
devotion. Lastly, it was difficult to determine whether one was experiencing social 
isolation, as it is a deeply subjective matter that seems to be rarely reported. Following 
these criteria, 27 cases were identified in which a situation of relative deprivation was a 
contributing factor to the undertaking of jihad. 
4.15.Social Affiliation 
This variable refers to a potential jihadis accessibility to jihadi ideology and official 
networks, in particular it refers to the role played by friends and family members. 
Consequently, it was possible to determine 42 cases in which such relationships played a 
role in the development of the particular jihadi case, corresponding to 26.1% of the 
thesis’ sample. The most prominent social affiliation types are siblings (19), followed by 
friends (12), spouses (8), and other family members (3); those that did not figure 
relatively frequently were ascribed to this last category. In zero cases were discipleship 
bonds found to play a role. 
Albeit Bakker and Sageman do not distinguish formerly between social affiliates’ roles in 
a case, the thesis seeks to deepen their analysis in light of future research. Consequently 
their roles have been categorized either as providing ideological support, for example by 
 Sageman, Marc. Understanding Terror Networks. Philadelphia: U of Pennsylvania, 2004. Print.64
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exposing family members to radical ideologies, this was especially common in cases 
involving siblings; as providing logistical support, for example by contributing funds to 
the perpetrators’ cause, or by simply being a gatekeeper to a broader, extremist network; 
or as providing both ideological and logistic support.  
Figure 3 shows the roles played by family members and friends within the networks. Due 
to the frequent overlap in members’ affiliation to networks, and to the fluidity of the roles 
played by said individuals, it was arduous to discern their roles. For example, the wife of 
one of the men involved in the 2012 Wootton Bassett Plot is also the sister of two 
brothers arrests in 2012 for planning to blow up the London Stock Exchange; hence she 
functioned in different roles in different networks. For this reason figure 3 presents a 
higher count than the actual individuals counted, as one person can perform multiple 
roles in multiple plots and attacks. Furthermore, those cases in which a social affiliation 
committed suicide during or after an attack, or in which the relative’s role could not be 
discerned precisely besides his/her involvement have been ascribed to the unclear 
category. 
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Figure 3: Social Affiliates’ Roles (2010-2015).
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4.16.Conclusion 
A priori an imperative disclaimer is in order; it is impossible to tailor complete 
biographies of all the persons involved in jihadi terrorism in Europe via open sources. In 
many cases information can be classified, as is the case of Erol Incedal’ semi-secret 
trial,  while in other instances certain variables that were of interest for this thesis were 65
not of interest of the open source’s author(s). The analysis of the biographies of 
individuals involved in jihadi terror plots and attacks in Europe between 2010 and 2015 
leads to  the evident conclusion that there is no standard jihadi terrorist in the first half of 
this decade. These persons’ ages range from 14 to 55, they completed different levels of 
education, and they derived from different religious backgrounds, some coming from 
secular ones whilst others came from Muslim or Christian backgrounds. 
Nevertheless, there is still a substantial amount of common factors between these 
individuals. Firstly, the bulk family origin is not from the EU, as only four persons 
originated from a Member State, meaning they are either first, second, or third generation 
migrants. Yet, almost half (47.82%) were raised in a EU country, and the overwhelming 
majority (65.83%) was recruited while living in a Member State. Ulteriorly, almost half 
of the persons whose occupational information could be found were either unemployed or 
come from the lower strata of society. Unsurprisingly, almost a quarter (24.8%) had a 
prior criminal record, and the vast majority were male (93.79%). Lastly, in 26.1% of the 
overall sample did kinship and friendship bonds play a role in recruitment, and in only 
6.2% of the cases did psychological disorders seem to play a contributing role.  
 "Erol Incedal Secret Terror Trial: Suspect Convicted of Possessing Terrorist Information." The Telegraph. 65
Telegraph Media Group, 17 Nov. 2014. Web. 20 May 2016. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-
the-uk/11235297/Erol-Incedal-secret-terror-trial-Suspect-convicted-of-possessing-terrorist-information.html>.
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5. Comparing Samples and Decades 
In Characteristics of Jihadi Terrorist in Europe (2001-2009) Edwin Bakker tailored a 
sample comprising 65 cases of jihadi terrorism orchestrated between 11 September 2001 
and 31 December 2009 that involved at least 336 people. Since its publication many 
events have been taking place both in Europe and outside, such as the Arab Spring, the 
establishment of the Islamic State, and the upsurge of Europeans traveling to Syria to 
fight. Consequently, the characteristics of the individual European jihadis behind terror 
plots and attacks may have been changing since the first decade of the 21st century. 
This chapter seeks to answer the thesis’ third research question, -whether the 
characteristics of jihadi terrorists have changed between the first and second decades of 
the 21st century- and will do so by cross-analyzing the sample collected for this thesis 
with the antecedent sample collected by Bakker. The variables and conclusions 
comprising the individuals’ biographies from the previous chapter, spanning from 2010 to 
2015, will be scrutinized with their 2001-2009 counterparts. 
5.1. Gender 
Of the thesis’ sample all but ten of the 161 persons were female, corresponding to its 
overall 6.21%. Similarly, of the 334 persons Bakker’s sample only seven are female 
(2.1%). Therefore, it is safe to say that in the second decade of the 21st century jihadi 
terrorism remains primarily a male thing, but that the share of women has increased. 
5.2. Geographical Background 
When looking at family origin in both samples, the bulk is of non-European descent, and 
are either first, second or third generation migrants. The region from which most people 
originate remained Northern Africa for both time periods, in particular people originate 
from Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, with Pakistan and Iraq being featured more 
frequently in 2001-2009, whilst in the subsequent period other countries of interest 
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include Pakistan, and are Bangladesh and Turkey. Between 2001-2009, 23 persons 
originated from Europe and are either converts, children of mix-marriages, or from 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Between 2010-2015 only in four instances did persons originate 
from Member States, and are from a mix marriage as in the case of the Swedish-Egyptian 
attacker of Jyllands-Posten, or are from the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. 
Moreover, regarding the group of second and third generation individuals, Bakker, in his 
work, does not their give exact figures but states that “a large majority of the persons of 
non-European extraction have been born and raised in Europe.” Similarly, between 
2010-2015, 47.82% of the sample was raised in a European country. 
Upon looking at the place of residence, almost all of the jihadis resided in a European 
country between 2001-2009, accounting for 305 people of Bakker’s sample. The most 
common countries oaf residence for this period are: Spain (68), UK (67), and France 
(53). In a like manner, for the thesis’ sample 139 of the 148 persons’ whose residence 
information could be found resided in a European country. The most common countries 
of residence of this period are: UK (51), France (24), and Germany (17). 
Focusing on nationalities, a few differences stick out when comparing the two time 
frames and samples. At priori, it has to be mentioned that Bakker included ‘double 
counts’, as some persons have more than one nationality. In this thesis’ dataset individual 
passport holders were counted separately from the dual citizenship holders. This being 
said, for prior timespan the most prominent nationalities were Morocco (68), Algerian 
(58), and the UK (54). Conversely, in the subsequent time period, the most common 
individual nationalities are by far from the UK (40), and France (27). Of those persons 
whose families originated outside of the EU, but who hold a EU passport as well, 
Morocco (11), Algeria (7), and Tunisia (7) are the most common between 2010-2015.  66
Around 20% of both samples comprised dual nationalities. Notably, there has been a 
 These include single passport holders from these countries in order to cross-compare non-EU passport holders.66
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significant decrease in non-EU passport holders implicated in jihadi plots and attacks for 
the second period of the 21st century as compared to its first decade. 
5.3. Socioeconomic Background 
There is little difference in terms of the socio-economic background of jihadi terrorists in 
Europe between 2001-2009 and 2010-2015. Of the 93 persons on which Bakker was able 
to find information, only five can be regarded as upper class, 36 as middle class, and 52 
as lower class; these respectively correspond to 5.38%, 38.71%, and 55.91%. Similarly, 
for the period between 2010-2015 it was possible to find information on 56 persons. Of 
these, the predominant class is ‘lower’, with 26 people; followed by ‘middle’, with 12 
individuals, and lastly ‘higher’, with merely three persons. These figures respectively 
correspond to 5.36%, 21.43%, and 46.43%. Hence, there is no significant difference in 
the ratios between the various socioeconomic classes from which jihadis derive from. 
Consequently, both samples support the theory that terrorists are mainly from the lower 
strata of society in the case of European plots and attacks. Yet, this may be merely 
reflective of immigrant Muslim communities in European countries.  67
5.4. Education 
Regarding the completed level of education by the various jihadi terrorists, Bakker was 
able to discern it for 72 persons. Of these, a majority finished secondary education, 
counting 50 individuals; and 22 had finished a tertiary form of education, such as college 
or university. In the thesis’ sample, it was possible to find information on 47 individuals. 
The vast majority, 32 persons, had completed at least secondary eduction, and 13 
completed a higher educational program. Two persons only completed primary school, 
yet considering their young age this was the only level of education possible to attain. 
 Connor, Philip, and Matthias Koenig. "Explaining the Muslim Employment Gap in Western Europe: Individual-67
Level Effects and Ethno-Religious Penalties." Social Science Research 49 (2015): 191-201. Social Science 
Research, 17 Jan. 2015. Web. 20 May 2016.
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Albeit in Bakker’s sample there is a considerable higher amount of individuals holding a 
tertiary degree, the bulk still completed only a secondary form of education, this being 
around 69% for both decades. Furthermore, there is striking decrease of persons that 
completed a higher form of education. Hence, the notion that few jihadis complete higher 
levels of educations is supported for the 21st century, especially in the second decade. 
5.5. Faith as Youth 
Bakker was able to find information on the childhood faith of 56 persons, 19 of which 
were converts; 18 of these came from a Christian background, and one from a Hindu 
background. Of the remaining lot, 11 were raised in a religious family and 26 did not 
have a particularly religious upbringing. These persons, according to Bakker, 
‘rediscovered’ their faith at a later age. When looking at the childhood faith of jihadis 
between 2010-2015, it was possible to accrue information on 52 individuals. 17 of these 
were brought up a religion different from Islam, five others were brought up in a secular 
household and converted at some point in life; this could have been on a personal whim, 
or due to a life-changing event such as marriage. 23 of the 52 people grew up in Muslim 
practicing families, and developed violent jihadi views in the period leading up to their 
arrests or attack. Furthermore, seven persons were brought up in a non-practicing Muslim 
family. 
Consequently, it appears there is an evening of the ratio between those who converted 
and were brought up in a Muslim household, whether practicing or not. Specifically, in 
the first decade the percentage of converts is 33.93%, and of those who were brought up 
in a Muslim household stands at 66.07%. In the second decade, these respective 
percentages are 42.31% and 57.69%. 
5.6. Occupation 
Bakker’s sample comprises the occupational information of 126 persons; of these, 34 
were unskilled workers, 19 had semi-skilled occupations, and 16 held a job that could be 
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described as skilled. Ulteriorly, 14 persons were entrepreneurs at the time they got 
involved in jihadi terrorism, and almost 30% of persons in this sample were unemployed 
at the time of their arrest. In regards to the sample collected for this thesis, it was possible 
to find the occupational background of 58 persons. The majority were unskilled workers, 
20 persons, ten were semi-skilled workers, and three persons were highly skilled workers. 
Ulteriorly, there are six students and five entrepreneurs in the sample; these include a bar 
and two business owners. Lastly, 24.14% of this sample was unemployed.  
The combined numbers of unskilled workers and unemployed persons for both decades, 
56.98% and 58.62% chronologically, confirm the notion that jihadi terrorists typically 
derive from these occupational backgrounds in the 21st century. 
5.7. Family Status 
In his work, Bakker was able to find information on the family status for 100 persons. Of 
these, 60 were married or engaged at the time of their arrest or attack and eight had been 
divorced; most of the married individuals and divorcees had children. 31 individuals were 
single. Regarding the subsequent 2010-2015 period, it was possible to find information 
on 55 persons’ family status. 42 persons were married at the time they were arrested or 
undertook violent jihad; of these 19 also had children. Four persons were divorced, and 
three of these had children from their previous marriage. Considering that around only 
one-fifth of the antecedent sample and one-third of the most recent one were not single, 
both do not seem to contradict the notion that jihadis are generally single. 
5.8. Criminal Record 
Of the 334 persons in Bakker’s sample, at least 68 had a criminal record while involved 
in jihadi terrorist activities, meaning that at least one-fifth of the jihadi terrorists in 
Europe in the first decade of the century had previously been convicted. Of these, only a 
few individuals were convicted for other terrorist activities; this is the case of half a 
dozen people. Moreover, of the persons comprised in the 2010-2015 sample, at least 40 
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had a criminal record when they got involved, meaning that almost a quarter (24.8%) had 
committed prior crimes. Therefore, based on the cross-analysis of the samples, there has 
been an increase of roughly 5% in persons with a criminal record involved in jihadi 
terrorism. 
5.9. Psychological Explanations 
The biographies of the persons comprised in Bakker’s 2001-2009 sample indicate that 12 
people suffered from a mental illness or disability, corresponding to the total sample’s 
4%. For the subsequent period, only ten persons were found to have some form of mental 
disability or illness such as PTSD and schizophrenia, corresponding to the overall 
sample’s 6.21%. This is considerably lower than the WHO’s estimate of European adults 
that suffered from a mental disease in 2015, standing at 27%.  Consequently, based on 68
both samples, the myth claiming jihadis to be mentally unstable persons cannot be 
supported.  
5.10.Age 
Bakker identified the age of 306 jihadi terrorists. The average age upon undertaking 
jihadi terrorism in 2001-2009 was 27.7, with the youngest terrorists being 16 and 17, the 
oldest being 62 years of age. Similarly, in the subsequent decade it was possible to find 
information on 148 jihadis, the average age being slightly younger, 27.05. The jihadis age 
for this period are comprised between 14 and 55. Consequently, the average age has been 
growing younger, as has the relative age of the youngest and eldest jihadis. 
5.11.Place of Recruitment 
In both samples, of the persons whose place of recruitment could be found, the majority 
were recruited in Europe, most of which in the countries they resided. For the 2001-2009 
period, Bakker found information on 117 persons, most of which resided in the UK (36), 
 "Data and Statistics: Prevalence of Mental Disorders." World Health Organization, 2016. Web. 16 May 2016. 68
<http://www.euro.who.int/en/health-topics/noncommunicable-diseases/mental-health/data-and-statistics>.
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followed by Spain (26), the Netherlands (13), France (13), and Germany (13). Out of the 
non-European countries of recruitment, Arab countries (8), Afghanistan (3), and Pakistan 
(3) stick out. Relating to the subsequent period, it was possible to find information 
pertaining to this variable in 123 jihadis’ biographies. Of these, the most common 
countries of recruitment are the United Kingdom (45), followed by France (18) and 
Germany (14). Conversely, only 10 persons were recruited in a non-EU country while 
residing in a Member State; outside of the Union, persons were recruited most often in 
Lebanon (3), Turkey (3), and Egypt (2). 
Albeit the European countries of recruitment remain more or less the same, the amount of 
jihadis residing in Europe being recruited abroad has decreased. Consequently, this 
difference, noted in the prior decade by Bakker in respect to Sageman, still holds in the 
second decade.  
5.12.Faith 
In both samples the information that could be found on the persons’ faith in the time 
leading up to the plot or attack points to an increased devotion. In the first decade this is 
the case of 65 individuals of the 68 on which information could be found; in the first half 
of the second decade this was encountered in 49 biographies. Consequently, the thesis 
and Bakker’s samples seem to support the assumption that before joining the jihad most 
people become more religious. 
5.13.Employment 
In both samples there were few cases of individuals committed to violent jihad full-time, 
meaning they mostly lived ‘normal lives’ and most of the persons whose information 
could be found held full-time jobs. In regards to the first time of bloc, over 50% of 
Bakker’s sample appear to have had full-time jobs (69 out of 111 cases), 15 held part-
time jobs and 33 were unemployed. The subsequent 2010-2015 timeframe supports this 
notion as well; almost 70% of the sample had a full-time job (36 out of 52), 14 persons 
!  of !61 73
were unemployed, and only two held a part-time job. Consequently, in Europe, 
participating in jihadi activity seems to be more of a ‘part-time’ activity. 
5.14.Relative Deprivation 
In regards to the idea of relative deprivation, Bakker was not able to find enough 
information to suggest that this concept is relevant to jihadi terrorism in Europe. Yet, he 
still identified 23 potential cases in which relative deprivation may have played a role. 
For the subsequent time period the thesis found 27 cases in which it may have played a 
role, corresponding to an increase from 6.8% to 16.77% between time periods. 
Given the limited amount of information, it is hard to draw an understanding on the role 
relative deprivation played between decades. Consequently, more research in the 
identified cases, 23 for 2001-2009 and 27 for 2010-2015, is warranted to draw such 
conclusions. 
5.15.Social Affiliation  69
In the first decade of the 21st century Bakker observed 121 cases in which social 
affiliations played a role in recruitment, corresponding to 35% of the overall sample. The 
leading bond is kinship, 62 cases, followed by friendship bonds, accounting for 59 cases. 
Consequently, in the first half of the second decade social affiliation played a role in 
26.1% of the overall sample. The most prominent connection being that marked by 
kinship, 30 cases, and subsequently by friendship, in 12 cases. Lastly, in neither decade 
could discipleship bonds be found. 
Albeit this percentage is a bit lower than its predecessor, what is important is that in at 
least a quarter of the 2010-2015 jihadi cases comprised in this thesis social affiliation 
played a role, with kinship bonds retaining importance on friendship bonds. Thus the 
 Although chapter four presented the roles of the social affiliates, a cross-comparison was not possible as these 69
were not identified by Bakker.
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social affiliation characteristics identified by Bakker in the prior decade still hold. Yet, the 
decrease is significant in terms of the persons’ radicalization process, as it could be 
indicative that individuals may not be radicalizing in groups anymore in favor of 
pursuing jihad alone. More research is warranted on this topic, as reaching such 
conclusions here would be beyond this thesis’ scope. 
5.16.Conclusion 
Upon comparing both samples and decades, there appears to be more similarities than 
stark differences. Jihadi terrorism in Europe remains predominately a male, late-20s part-
time activity. In fact, the average age of those involved in jihadi terrorism remains largely 
unchanged around an average of 27, and around 50% and 70% of persons in the first and 
second decades respectively, whose occupational information could be found, held full-
time jobs. Yet, the bulk of these persons still derived from the lower strata of society, with 
almost 30% being unemployed in the first decade, and 24.14% in the second. Ulteriorly, 
almost a quarter of these persons possessed a criminal record when undertaking jihad. In 
regards to persons’ faith and social affiliations, data from both decades support the notion 
that individuals’ religiosity increased in the period leading up to their jihadi undertaking, 
and that kinship bonds retain importance over friendship bonds in recruitment. 
Moreover, the geographical cross-comparison of both decades presents continuities and 
dissimilarities. In regards to the former, the bulk is of non-European descent and are 
either first, second or third generation migrants, of which a majority in the first time-bloc 
and almost half in the second were raised in Europe. Furthermore, the majority of 
European jihadi terrorists were recruited in a Member State, and around 20% of both 
samples held dual nationalities. Yet, when looking at the similarities the differences begin 
to surface. There is a shift in which countries jihadis are mostly recruited, moving from 
the UK (36), Spain (26), and the Netherlands (13), to the UK (45), France (18), and 
Germany (14). Notably, there has been a significant decrease in non-EU passport holders 
implicated in the 2010-2015 jihadi cases. 
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There are two more divergent characteristics that are worth mentioning here. The first 
regards psychological explanations to the undertaking of jihad; between decades there 
has been a rise in the number of persons with such disabilities from 4% to 6.21%. The 
second regards the role of relative deprivation; there has been an increase from 6.8% to 
16.77% of cases in which it may have had an impact. Yet, given the limited amount of 
information, it is hard to draw a conclusion on the role relative deprivation played 
between decades. 
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6. Conclusions & Final Remarks 
Terrorism is a highly complex and constantly changing phenomenon, one whose 
characteristics are contingent on time and location. In fact, how this form of terrorism 
affects a region, and its populations has varied in size and shape throughout recent 
history. The features of the networks and the individuals involved are constantly 
changing, molding the fluidity of organizational structures, and their modus operandi. 
Some of these include, for instance, the realization that jihadi terrorism is not confined to 
the Muslim world; the ‘home-grown’ nature of the Madrid 2005 bombers; and the current 
wave of Western foreign fighters. The dynamic nature of these networks makes gathering 
information on their characteristics and their members an imperative for 
(counter-)terrorism research, and for policy formulation purposes. 
Consequently, the purpose of this thesis is theory development, and not theory testing, 
adopting a ‘building bloc’ approach. This method serves to identify common patterns in 
the event of a complex and broad phenomenon, as jihadi terrorism is, by studying its 
subtypes of events, or cases -i.e. plots, foiled, failed, and executed attacks. In order to 
contribute to the academic literature addressing this topic -the characteristics of jihadi 
terror networks and individuals- it sought to answer three research questions, namely: (1) 
what are the characteristics of the networks behind jihadi terror plots and attacks in 
Europe between 2010-2015?; and (2) what are the characteristics of the individual jihadi 
terrorists between 2010-2015?; and (3) have the characteristics of jihadi terrorists in 
Europe changed between the first (2001-2009) and second (2010-2015) decades of the 
21st century? 
In order to answer its research questions the thesis scrutinized 68 cases of jihadi terrorism 
spanning from 2010 until 2015, involving at least 161 individuals and 60 networks, and 
cross-compared them with their 2001-2009 counterparts. Edwin Bakker, in 
Characteristics of Jihadi Terrorists in Europe (2001-2009) analyzed 65 cases of jihadi 
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terrorism, involving at least 336 people and 28 networks, according to the 18 variables 
tailored by Sageman in Understanding Terror Networks. In this chapter the conclusions 
reached in regards to the thesis’ guiding research questions will be presented, along with 
some concluding remarks. Yet, it has to be mentioned at priori that given the difficulties 
and obstacles implicit to open sources, the overall picture of the puzzle addressed here is 
not complete. 
6.1. European Jihadi Terrorists and Their Networks in the 21st Century 
In order to answer its first research question, the analysis brought under scrutiny of the 
almost 20 variables the 60 networks active on EU soil between 2010 and 2015. Yet, given 
the nature of the thesis’ open sources, it was not possible to uncover all the information 
pertaining to every network. Consequently, the analysis limited itself to some general 
traits and observations of the networks on which it was possible to uncover a substantial 
amount of information, corresponding roughly to two-thirds of the network, and of the 
variables that are consistent in at least two rough thirds of the sample. 
Hence, the broad picture pertaining to jihadi networks and their characteristics is the 
following. The networks differ between one another in terms of countries in which they 
operated, their sizes and ages, the targets they chose, and the extent to which they came 
close to achieving their plans. Notably, in 2014 and 2015 terrorist were either able to 
reach the execution phase of their plans, or were foiled by the authorities; none failed. 
This could be indicative of a growing execution-ability of jihadi terrorists, but more 
research on the topic is warranted to draw such conclusions here. In regards to their sizes 
and targets, they varied from one individual to almost 20, and primarily chose high-
profile and public targets. Transposition means and their locations are less and less 
chosen as targets, with only two foiled attacks in 2015 recorded since 2012. Social 
affiliations and official jihadi terror networks also played a role in forming networks. 
Notably, in 2011 more than half of the cases had an official terror link, and 19 networks 
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between 2010-2015 had some form of social affiliation playing a role in their creation, 
with brotherly bonds being the most frequent. 
In terms of within network homogeneity, age, gender, prior criminal record, and faith are 
the four variables that are most homogenous. Most networks show the same pattern of 
increased faith before undertaking violent lesser jihad, were composed of individuals 
with prior criminal records, and were mostly male with the exception of a few women, 
typically wives of the jihadis. This is the case of four networks composed exclusively of 
married couples. Networks are also pretty homogenous in terms of recruitment. In fact, 
most of the persons that resided in a Member State and were raised in the same country 
were subsequently recruited in the same country as well. Most networks are also 
homogenous in terms of nationalities held by those comprising them, but they are less so 
when looking at the within-network dominating country of origin. Lastly, the level of 
education within networks is pretty homogenous, and in a few there was a mixture 
between individuals with a higher degree and persons with only a secondary education. 
In order to answer its second research question, the thesis scrutinized the biographies of 
the 161 jihadis according to Bakker and Sageman’s variables, and reached the conclusion 
that there is no standard jihadi terrorist in the second decade of the 21st century. These 
persons’ ages range from 14 to 55, they completed different levels of education, and they 
derived from different religious backgrounds, some coming from secular ones whilst 
others from Muslim and Christian backgrounds. The bulk family origin is not from the 
EU, meaning they are either first, second, or third generation migrants. Yet, 47.82% and 
65.83% were respectively raised and recruited in a EU country. Moreover, almost half of 
the persons’ whose information could be found came from the lower strata of society or 
were unemployed; around a quarter had a prior criminal record; and 93.79% were males. 
Lastly, in 26.1% of the cases did social affiliations play a role in recruitment, and in only 
6.2% of them did psychological disorders play a contributing role. 
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In order to answer the thesis’ third question, the biographies of the first decade’s 65 cases 
have been cross-compared with those tailored for this thesis. Upon comparing the second 
decade with its predecessor’s conclusions, there appears to be more similarities than 
disparities. In other words, a substantial amount of the jihadi terrorists’ characteristics 
applicable in the first decade are still valid for the time period between 2010 and 2015. 
Jihadi terrorism in the 21st century in Europe remains predominately a male, late-20s 
part-time activity with the bulk being of non-European descent and are either first, second 
or third generation migrants of which a majority was raised and subsequently recruited in 
a Member State. Nevertheless, there is a shift in which countries jihadis are mostly 
recruited, moving from the UK (36), Spain (26), and the Netherlands (13), to the UK 
(45), France (18), and Germany (14). Notably, there has been a significant decrease in 
non-EU passport holders implicated in the 2010-2015 jihadi cases. The number of 
persons possessing more than one passport remained around 20%. Lastly, between 
decades there has been a rise in the number of persons with psychological disabilities, 
from 4% to 6.21%, and an increase of cases in which relative deprivation played a role, 
from 6.8% to 16.77%. 
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6.2. Final Remarks 
As mentioned throughout the thesis, the picture of the characteristics of jihadi terrorists 
and their networks in Europe remains incomplete. Given the difficulties inherent to open 
sources, and the complexity of the phenomenon at hand it remains to be seen if we will 
ever be able to tailor a complete picture. Nevertheless, research on this topic, such as 
collecting information on these individuals and their networks, remains a necessity in 
order to maintain an updated understanding on the process of joining the lesser, violent 
jihad. Consequently, more research is needed on the topic both for theory building and 
theory testing purposes. In this regard it would be useful to cross-compare the thesis’ 
findings with similar studies focusing on jihadi terrorists, but that use different criteria for 
data research. This could, for instance, take the form of a cross-analysis of the jihadis 
comprised in the thesis’ database with individuals that travel to join a foreign conflicts to 
undertake jihad. Ulteriorly, the similarities and disparities encountered between decades 
will need to be scrutinized further to see if they hold throughout the remainder of the 
decade.  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Annex I: 
Annex I comprises a brief description of the cases of jihadi terrorism between 2010-2015. 
If a case’s title only figures ‘plot’, and no other label such as failed, foiled, or executed, it 
is a plot. The country or countries listed under the case’s title are those Member States 
that were directly affected by it, and the date corresponds to are either the time of arrests 
for plots, foiled and failed attacks; and in the cases of executed attacks the first day on 
which the attack began was chosen for categorization purposes. 
2010 
British Airways Plot 
UK - 25 February 2010 
A thirty year old man of Bangladeshi origins was sentenced to 30 years in prison in 2011 
for his intent to plot a plane bombing while he was working at British Airways the year 
prior. At the British firm he worked as a computer specialist, having graduated in 
electronics from Manchester University with a 2.2. Communication information shows 
that he was in direct contact with imam Anwar al-Awlaki, with whom he was planning 
the plot, and he is accused of being a member of Jamaat al-Mujahideen Bangladesh and 
to turning to the American-Yemeni preacher once the latter groups lost hold in his home 
country. In court he denounced these links, but admitted to procuring funding for jihadi 
terrorism. Throughout his plotting he also maintained communications with his brother, 
who also shared his extremist world views and was a known associate of al-Awlaki. 
Attempted Stabbing on British MP - Failed Attack 
UK - 14 May 2010 
Roshonara Choudhry in May 2010 attempted to stab British MP Stephens Timms for 
voting in favor of the Iraq invasion in retaliation of 9/11. Prior to her attack she was an 
English and communications student at King’s College London, and was a practicing 
Muslim in her youth. According to court transcripts, she was radicalized via online 
sermons of AQAP leader Anwar al-Awlaki posted on YouTube. At the time of the attack 
she was unemployed, and her family was relying on government benefits. She is the first 
Briton to be inspired by al-Qaeda to attempt to kill a prominent figure on UK soil.  
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Lars Vilks Attack - Failed Attack 
Sweden - 15 May 2010 
Since the 2007 drawings depicting the Prophet Mohammed were posted, and authored by 
Lars Vilks, he has been a prominent target for violent jihadi extremists. In May 2010 his 
house was attacked with molotov cocktails, and two brothers of  Swedish-Kosovarian 
descent were arrested and convicted of arson. The two brothers denied their involvement 
in court, yet one of them was seriously burned and they both identified Lars Vilks as an 
enemy of Islam to the court. They were sentenced to two and three years in prison for 
arson.  
Plot to Kill Norwegian Politician, and to Incite Hatred - Plot 
Norway - June 2010 
Mullah Krekar, also known as Najmuddin Faraj Ahmad, is the founder of Ansar Al-Islam, 
an insurgent group notorious for its operations in Northern Iraq in the early years of the 
millennium. On 11 July 2011 he was indicted on violation of terrorism laws, including 
threatening private individuals and a public official in 2010. His statements were made in 
response to the Norwegian authorities intent on deporting him from the Scandinavian 
country, and were given to different various media outlets from around the world. In 2012 
he was sentenced to 5 imprisonment by a Norwegian court. 
Oslo Plot 
Norway - July 8, 2010 
This is the first case in which individuals are tried under the stricter anti-terrorism laws; 
they were introduced by the Norwegian government not much earlier. Two of the 
defendants were charged with intent to commit a terrorist act, and the third was charged 
for providing explosives to the other two. Targets included the Jyllands-Posten journal, 
cartoonist Kurt Westergaard, who drew pictures of the Prophet wearing a turban-bomb, 
and the Chinese Embassy in Oslo. The ringleader, who is of Chinese Uyghur descent, 
stood accused in 2010 and convicted in 2012 of planning the attack together with al-
Qaeda senior officials whilst training in Pakistan. 
Jyllands-Posten Attack - Failed Attack 
Denmark, Belgium - 10 September 2010 
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A Chechnyan-Belgian was arrested near a park in Copenhagen in connection to an 
explosion at a nearby hotel. He was the only injured person involved, and no casualties 
were reported. The explosive device, a letter bomb possessing the force of a hand 
grenade, was intended for the Jyllands-Posten newspaper; the motive, once more, was to 
retaliate against its publishing of Mohammed cartoons in 2005. The perpetrator was born 
in 1986 in Chechnya, and was living in Belgium at the time of the botched explosion; he 
admitted he accidentally set of the explosion in the hotel.  
2010 European ‘Mumbai-Style’ Terror Plot 
UK, Germany, France, amongst others - 29 September 2010 
The arrest of a German of Afghani descent led to the arrest of several Europeans of Arab 
background for plotting a ‘Mumbai-Style’ terror plot across Europe; the alleged targets 
being located primarily in the UK, Germany and France. This plot exemplifies the 
difficulties in researching jihadi terrorism cases in Europe; albeit the supposed network 
was much larger, according to one of them, it was only possible to find information on a 
few names. This is because of several factors including the limited amount of public 
information, and the conflicting accounts presented in the media. Two members were 
confirmed killed by US drone strikes, whilst another has since been detained at US 
Bagram Airfield in Northern Afghanistan. A third man was arrested in Pakistan after he 
fled Europe, and was subsequently extradited to France in 2012; he has since been 
charged, and detained in custody. One man was prosecuted in Germany in 2011 and was 
handed a five year sentence. Moreover, a few commonalities arose from the individuals 
that could be included in the data set: they were born in Europe, they radicalized at the 
Hamburg Taiba Mosque (the same of the 9/11 hijacker Mohammed Atta), they received 
training abroad and necessitated a formal al-Qaeda contact to put their radical ideas in 
motion. 
Plot to Attack Targets in Belgium, and Recruit Jihadi Sympathizers  
Belgium - November 2010 
On 5 December 2012, a Belgian court sentenced Hassan Hamdoui, the figure at the center 
of the so called Hamdaoui Cell of 14 suspected terrorist arrested in November 2010, to 
five years imprisonment for attempting to participate in terrorist activities. The other 13 
were acquitted for lack of evidence. Hamdaoui, a Belgian citizen of Moroccan origin, 
was accused of planning terrorist attacks in Belgium. 
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Plot to Blow Up NATO Troops Traveling by Train in Belgium  
Belgium, Austria - 2 December 2010 
A Chechen emigrant residing in Austria was detained at the Vienna International Airport 
for plotting an attack against NATO infrastructure in Belgium; Brussels had previously 
placed an international arrest warrant on the man. He was arrested following an 
international arrest warrant issued by Belgium; he is suspected of heading a terrorist cell 
in Belgium’s Antwerp. The man is also believed to have strong ties with Dokku Umarov, 
leader of “Imarat Kavkaz.” 
Stockholm Suicide Bombing - Executed Attack 
Sweden - 11 December 2010 
On December 11, Sweden’s first ever suicide bomber carried out two attacks in the a 
pedestrian shopping area in Stockholm. Firstly, he detonated his abandoned car on a side 
street injuring two pedestrian and killing no one. Secondly, authorities believe that he 
accidentally detonated one of the pipe bomb attached to his body, killing himself and no 
others. Shortly before the perpetrator carried out his attack, he sent prerecorded 
audiotapes in Swedish, English, and Arabic to Swedish News agency TT and to SAPO. 
He justified his attack as in retaliation to the presence of Swedish troops in Afghanistan, 
and against the cartoons depicting the Prophet Mohammed. The main perpetrator was a 
28-year-old Iraqi born Swede who migrated to Europe when he was eleven years old, and 
demonstrated an increase in his Muslim faith shortly before the attack; he changed 
Mosques, as his views were considered too radical by the congregation. It is believed the 
man was responding to a video posted by al-Shabab earlier that year, in which a figure 
called for his Swedish Muslim brother to kill Vilks. A second man of Algerian descent 
was subsequently arrested, charged with funding terrorism and therefore sentenced to 
seven years in prison. Both men were friends prior to the incident. 
Jyllands-Posten Plot 
Sweden, Denmark - 29 December 2010 
Danish authorities charged four suspects, a Tunisian and three Swedes with planning an 
attack on the Jyllands-Posten newspaper in retaliation for publishing a string of cartoons 
depicting the Prophet Muhammed. The four were residents of Sweden, of which three 
were nationals, and their target was in Denmark. According to the Danish authorities the 
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three had been planning ‘Mumbai-style’ attacks, which killed approximately 166 people 
in 2008, with over 600 people injured. In 2012 they were sentenced to 12 years each. 
Plot to Blow Up the London Stock Exchange 
UK - 29 December 2010 
Nine men were arrested in 2010 and sentenced in 2012, in the UK, between five and 
twenty-two years in prison for planning to bomb several British high-profile locations, 
including the Big Ben, the London Stock Exchange, and the house of Mayor Boris 
Johnson. Four of the men were form Stoke, three from Cardiff, and two from London; 
they will all British residents and nationals, besides the two ringleaders born in 
Bangladesh. The group also includes two brothers, the younger apparently was 
subordinate to his older sibling. The three cells had met via different radical groups of the 
nature of the Sharia4[enter country] network, and maintained contact through internet-
based services. The men had never participated in jihadi related activities abroad; they 
self-radicalized in the UK, and were inspired by AQAP’s Inspire magazine.  
Kurt Westergaard Axe Attack - Failed Attack 
Denmark - 31 December 2010 
On New Year’s Day a Somali man broke into the house of Kurt Westergaard, another 
cartoonist who drew the Prophet in Jyllands-Posten’s 2005 publication, wielding an axe 
and screaming. According to relatives, the suspect, in the period leading up to the attack, 
was under a significant amount of stress as the PET was trying to enlist him as an 
informant for his time spent in East Africa. Yet, in court this was found to not be 
medically significant, and the prosecution contended that his act was terrorist in nature 
because it was an attempt at freshening the population. The man is also believed to have 
plotted an earlier terror attack on US Secretary Clinton in Kenya, but was not charged 
and was instead sent back to Denmark where he was a resident. In 2011 he was sentenced 
to 9 years behind bars. 
2011 
Frankfurt Airport Shooting - Executed Attack 
Germany - 2 March 2011 
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This incident marks the first time in Germany in which an Islamist terror attack resulted 
in fatalities. On March 2 a singular gunman opened fire on a United States Air-Force, 
killing a serviceman and the bus driver, whilst non-fatally injuring two more people. 
Before opening fire the man asked an American soldier if they were being deployed, and 
upon receiving confirmation he screamed ‘Allahu Akbar’ and opened fire. The man 
radicalized upon viewing videos online depicting US troops raping and beating Muslim 
women. In 2012 a German court sentenced him to life in prison. 
Plot to Set Off Explosives in Crowded Areas in Dusseldorf 
Germany - April 2012 
This plot, involving the mostly home-grown jihadi “Dusseldorf Cell”, involved the 
setting off two explosives in crowded areas on directive of al-Qaeda, one at first and the 
second one once the medics arrived. The ringleader had received training on the 
Afghanistan-Pakistan border and had received direct authorizations from higher ranking 
al-Qaeda operatives; three of the four were AQ members and the fourth a sympathizer of 
the organization, according to the authorities. The quartet had not selected a specific 
target yet, as they were still in the experimental phase testing the interactions of different 
chemicals and were under surveillance since 2010. In 2011 they were arrested and 
charged; in 2014 they were sentenced between four and a half years to nine. The 
ringleader got the longest sentence. 
Plot to Recruit Terror Cells for Attacks in the EU 
Austria, Germany - May 2011 
Two men, a Turkish-German and an Austrian of Afghan descent, were arrested in 2011 on 
suspicion of being members of al-Qaeda. On one of the two men a file title “Future 
Works” was found, on which documents were encrypted and embedded in porn movies. 
These files uncovered al-Qaeda’s future plans to attack Europe, including a “Mumbai-
Style” plot and the seizing of cruise ships, and its self-awareness of being monitored 
closely and accurately. Its leaders, in the files, confirmed their frustration in not being 
capable of landing a large-scale attack in Europe. The two men met in Northern Pakistan, 
and one of them is believed to be one of the founding members of the German Taliban 
Mujahideen. In 2013 both were convicted; one of the men was sentenced to nine years, 
and the second to six years and nine months. 
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Plot to Attack Jewish Communities in Manchester 
UK  - July 2011 
In early July 2011 British authorities uncovered a terror plot targeting Jewish 
communities in Manchester. A couple was arrested and convicted as the sole perpetrators 
and plotters. The man has been attributed as the case’s mastermind; investigators point to 
his problematic past with the law, having been arrested for several crimes, and to his 
relationship with his wife as motives. In 2011 he was handed an indeterminate sentence 
with a minimum of seven and a half years, in 2012 she was sentenced to eight years 
imprisonment. The couple had radicalized via online material, and acquired explosive-
building knowledge from a manual they had downloaded from the internet called “Make 
a Bomb in the Kitchen of your Mom.” At the time of their arrest they had not managed to 
construct a functional device, nor had they picked a specific target. 
Birmingham’s Explosive Rucksacks Plot 
UK - September 2011 
In September 2011 UK authorities launched a raid against a jihadi cell of 11 men for 
planning an attack that would have left thousands dead, comparable to the 7/7 and 9/11 
bombings. They intended to leave eight rucksacks packed with explosives in 
Birmingham. The cell was created by Irfan Naseer and an associate of his after partaking 
in two training camps, one with Harakat al-Mujahidin and successively one run by al-
Qaeda. The leader, Naseer, was an unemployed pharmacologist who applied his skills to 
bomb making, and his associate was described as being at the bottom 2-5% in regards of 
his cognitive ability. The two men then expanded their inner circle to four, at which point 
they began exploring family and friendship networks for recruitment purposes. 
Throughout this process, as the circle expanded, sub-groups of the men between two and 
four travelled to Pakistan to gain terror training. Notably, the brother of one of the 
English Defense League plotters was also involved in this plot. In 2013 the men received 
sentences spanning from 40 months in jail, to life imprisonment for their role in the plot. 
2012 
Plot to Incite Jihadi Terrorism in France 
France - Spring 2012 
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A woman had her assets frozen and was sought for her support of Forsane Alizza, an 
Islamist organization that was dismantled that year for its overt support of violent jihad. 
She responded to this even for calling for holy war on French streets, and invoking IS; 
this was the reasoning for her asset freezing. She reportedly fled to Syria, where she has 
joined the Islamic State and continues to incite terrorism and recruit agents for jihad in 
Europe. 
Toulouse & Montauban Shootings - Executed Attack 
France - 11–22 March 2012 
This is a series of three gun attacks committed by the same perpetrator, Mohamed Merah, 
a 23 year old French Algerian from Toulouse. The man’s killing spree left seven people 
dead, including three Jewish children, a Rabbi, and three French service men. His attack 
ended after a 32 hour siege of his house, during which he revealed details and motives for 
his actions; he was later sprayed with bullets whilst trying to escape from a window. 
Merah had a troubled past, dropping out of school and having been sentenced at least 15 
times by the French juvenile court system; most of his crimes involved petty theft 
accusations. He reportedly radicalized in prison after serving time for a violent robbery 
involving a senior citizen. Currently, his brother has been preliminarily been charged with 
complicity in murder and theft, and involvement in terrorism; he allegedly provided his 
younger brother with logistic and ideological support. He has been in custody seen he’s 
been charged in 2012. 
Plot to Blow Up Synagogue in Milan 
Italy - 15 March 2012 
A 20 year old Moroccan-Italian was arrested for the promotion of terrorist training, and 
for plotting a terror act; on his laptop authorities found extensive training materials, such 
as books, magazines and manuals (some of which he translated himself), and a virtual 
blueprint and scouting of the Via Della Guastalla synagogue in Milan. Ulteriorly, he had 
been diffusing said material on web forums he administered under different aliases. The 
young man had migrated to Italy at the age of six, lived with his parents, and worked as 
low-skilled labour aid. Throughout his childhood he wasn’t a practicing Muslim, and 
didn’t frequent a mosque even after his self-radicalization, as he found the teachings were 
too moderate. In 2013 an Italian court sentenced him to four years and eight months in 
prison. 
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Toy Car Plot - Foiled Attack 
UK - 25 April 2012 
In 2013 four British citizens, three of Pakistani and one of Bangladeshi backgrounds, 
were sentenced for a cumulative 44 years sentence for plotting to attack a Territorial 
Army (TA) center in Luton in 2012. They were arrested in 2012 with for intending to 
strap a home-made explosive to a toy car and drive it under the army gate. Via the 
connection of an al-Qaeda operative the two ring leaders had travelled to Pakistan to 
receive military training, but were reportedly sent back shortly upon arriving due to 
language barriers. Once back in Luton, they recruited the remaining two cell members 
and shifted their sight from attacking the coalition forces in Afghanistan to targeting them 
at home. 
Danish ‘Terror Plot’ 
Denmark - 29 May 2012 
Two Danish brothers of Somali origin that had been living in Denmark for over 16 years 
were arrested and sentenced in 2012 to three and a half years; they stood accused of 
training with the aim of carrying out a terrorist attack the same year. The older brother 
was the only one of the two to have attended a training camp by al-Shabaab in Somalia, 
yet the court did not find sufficient evidence that his training led to the acquisition of 
substantial terrorist skills; in 2014 both their sentences were reduced to two years.  
Attack on Belgian Police Officers - Executed Attack 
France, Belgium - 8 June 2012 
In June 2012 a 35-year-old Parisian travelled from his French hometown to the 
neighborhood of Molenbeek, and stabbed two Belgian police officers in the metro. He 
had justified his actions as retaliation for Belgium’s anti-Muslim laws, referring to 
government’s ban of the niqab  veil, and for the presence of “infidels” in Afghanistan. 
The two officers were seriously injured, and the man was sentenced to 17 years by a 
Belgian court the subsequent year. 
English Defense League Plot - Failed Attack 
UK - 30 June 2012 
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In June 2012 six British men of Pakistani and Bangladeshi origin plotted to attack an 
English Defence League (EDL) rally, in particular they sough to kill its leading exponent 
Tommy Robinson; the men were retaliating against the group’s increasing Islamophobic 
rhetoric and actions. They intended to hit the crowd with an improvised explosive device 
(IED), the first ever found on UK soil, an idea they got from reading AQAP’s Inspire 
magazine. Yet, they arrived two hours late on the scene and missed the rally, thus sparing 
many lives that day. The explosive was found in the car belonging to one of the 
perpetrators, which was impounded the day of the attack; the owner had mis-filled some 
paperwork. Once impounded the authorities found the IED, along with several sawed 
shotguns, revolvers, and a plethora of knives; they arrested the implicated individuals 
within hours from the discovery. Each individual was sentence to almost 20 years in 
prison in 2013. 
Wootton Bassett Plot  
UK - 5 July 2012 
In July UK authorities disrupted a plot by a British jihadi convert and two accomplices; 
they were planning on killing MI5 and MI6 chiefs in the town of Royal Wootton Bassett. 
Two of the men had received training in Pakistan and tried to recruit British Muslims for 
terror camps located outside the EU. The radicalization process of the trio is attributed to 
the lectures of Anjem Choudary, a radical Muslim activist; in particular, the British 
convert’s conversion and radicalization are captured by a BBC documentary. On a related 
note, the wife of one of the men, a former MET officer, was arrested for posting digital 
copies of AQAP’s Inspire magazine; she is also the sister of the two brothers convicted in 
the 2010 London Stock Exchange plot. In 2013 the three men were sentenced to four to 
nine years in prison, and the wife was jailed for a year. 
Plot to Attack Israeli Tourist in Cyprus 
Cyprus, Sweden - 7 July 2012 
A 24 year old Swedish and Lebanese national was arrested in 2012, and subsequently 
convicted, of plotting to attack Israeli interests abroad and of being a member of 
Hezbollah. Prosecutors pointed to the operational similarities with the Burgas airport 
bombing that was attributed to the Lebanese terror organization as well. In 2013 he was 
sentenced to four years in prison by a Cypriot court. 
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2012 Burgas Bus Bombing - Executed Attack 
Bulgaria - 18 July 2012 
The explosion took place at the Sarafovo Airport in Burgas, Bulgaria, and claimed the 
lives of seven people including the main perpetrator. At the scene a US license and Social 
Security Number card were found, both with fraudulent names and addresses. 
Consequently, the initial reports of the primary suspect and his two alleged associates, 
whom to this day remain at large, presented a confused picture: from the persons’ details 
being counterclaimed by differed governments and news agencies, to the facts of the case 
at hand the initial information was murky at best. The trio was reportedly radicalized in 
Lebanon whilst attending university in Beirut, and was trained and operated under the 
guidance of Hezbollah’s military wing. In response to this attack, the European Union 
blacklisted Hezbollah’s military wing, and the two alleged living suspects will face trial 
in absentia in Bulgaria. 
Gibraltar Plot 
UK - 1 August 2012 
Three men, two Russians of Chechen descent and a Turk, were arrested and charged with 
plotting a terrorist attack in Gibraltar; it was supposed to coincide with the 2012 
Olympics being held in London. The men intended to utilize a remote controlled airplane 
to drop explosives either on masses watching live streaming of the sporting events, or on 
the Puerta Europa shopping mall. Furthermore, the two Russians are accused of being 
members of al-Qaeda, having received training in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the Turk 
with facilitating the plot. Ulteriorly, one of the Russians had been a former member of 
Russian special forces Spetsnaz. Their arrests was the culmination of cooperation 
operation amongst British, American, Russian and other authorities. Yet, intelligence 
sharing led to their arrests, and to the collapse of their case in 2013; the US failed to share 
a video in which a black-site detainee implicated the former Spetsnaz agent. After nine 
months in pre-trial detention they were released; subsequently, the two Chechens were 
deported to Russia, and the Turk remained in Spain where he seeking legal retribution 
from the state. 
Attack on Kosher Grocery Store - Executed Attack 
France - 19 September 2012 
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In September, two hooded assailants threw a brick through the window of a kosher 
grocery in Sarcelles, a northern neighborhood in Paris, France, followed by a package 
bomb. DNA found on remnants of the explosive led investigators to the home of a 33 
year old French man, who had converted to Islam and radicalized in prison. Upon 
breaching his apartment the man stood up and fired six rounds at the police in front of his 
pregnant second wife, prompting offices to return fire and ultimately killing him. 
Subsequent investigations brought to light his will along with three other’s final words, 
and ulterior bomb making materials; this evidence led to the uncovering of a plot to 
attack jews and jewish locations across France, and the arrest of 11 other jihadi terror 
suspects in several French cities. 
Plot to Attack Jewish Locations Throughout France  
France - 6 October 2012 
The raid on the house of one of the two suspects of perpetrating the attack on the kosher 
store in Sarcelles led to arrests of 20 suspected jihadis in the French Rivera. The French 
authorities and media outlets labelled this cell as the most deadly since the mid-1990s 
Armed Islamic Group of Algeria (GIA) terrorized French communities. Unfortunately, 
due to the fact that not all 20 arrestees were charged, or prosecuted, and very few names 
were released, it was only possible to find information on a few of the network’s 
members. Yet, what came to light is a picture of  four young men in the 20s and 30s, who 
had recently converted to Islam and a few of which had sought out organizations in Syria 
to fight Bashar al-Assad. At the end of 2015 one man had been released from custody for 
insufficient evidence, whilst two men remain detained as they await trial, and the fourth 
man may face trial in absentia; he is believed to be still in Syria, and to have risen in the 
ranks of IS. 
The CERN Plot 
France - 8 October 2009 
In 2009 an Algerian Frenchman was detained on suspicion of planning an unspecified 
attack, presumably against the scientific institute, CERN, at which he worked, and key 
French public figures. The incriminating evidence stems from email exchanges the 
scientist undertook with an al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb agent, in which he declared 
to be ready to become an active agent in France. He was detained for two and a half years 
before being formally charged, tried, and sentenced to five years in prison in 2012. 
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Bonn Train Station Plot - Failed Attack 
Germany - 10 December 2012 
A German national is accused of planting a self-made pipe bomb in a sports bag at the 
Bonn train station in December 2012. Fortunately, the device’s detonation process was set 
off, but the bomb failed to ignite due to a product defect. The subsequent investigations 
by the authorities led to three ulterior arrests, besides the man in question, and the 
uncovering of a plot to kill the leader of Pro NRW, an anti-Islam activist group in 
Germany. At the end of 2015 he was being tried along with his three accomplices in the 
foiled attack on Pro NRW politicians. 
2013 
Attack on Lars Hedegaard - Failed Attack 
Denmark - 5 February 2013 
In February 2013 a Danish man of Lebanese origin, posing as a postal employee needing 
a sign-off on a package, attempted to shoot anti-Islam critic Lars Hedegaard. The shot 
missed the target’s head, nearly, and the gun subsequently jammed leading to a scuffle 
between the two until the assailant took of running. The man was arrested in 2014 in 
Turkey attempting to get to Syria with a fake passport. The same year he was included in 
a package prisoner swap between Turkey and ISIS, causing a diplomatic spat between the 
former and Denmark.   
Echaabi Plot 
Spain - 23 February 2013 
At the beginning of the year a Moroccan man was arrested by the Spanish authorities; 
they accused him of plotting an attack on public figures, and other targets in Spain. The 
man, at the time of his arrests, was attempting to obtain firearms and explosives and had 
previously tried to join jihad abroad. He had previously tried to enter Gaza via Egypt, and 
Morocco with the intentions of carrying out an attack. The man was not reportedly tied to 
any radical organizations, rather authorities describe him as a self-radicalized ‘lone-wolf’ 
with a profile that starkly resembles that of Mohammed Merah, the man responsible for 
the Toulouse and Montauban 2012 attacks. At the time of writing, the man is in the 
authorities’ custody as they investigate further.  
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Anti-Pro NRW Politicians - Foiled Attack 
Germany - 13 March 2013 
The arrest of a suspect in the failed Bonn train sta2tion bombing in Germany led to three 
further arrests; an Albanian, a Turkish-German, and another German, ages spanning from 
22 to 42, are facing trial alongside a fourth suspect for planning on killing Markus 
Beisicht, leader of Pro NRW. The alleged motive was to retaliate against Pro NRW’s 
Prophet Muhammed drawing contests, the winners of which would have their work 
displayed in front of Muslim landmarks. At the end of 2015 all four were under trial; the 
trio face 15 years each for the murder plot, and the bomber faces life in prison. The trial 
was supposed to end in April 2015, but it has been prolonged.  
Plot to Attack High Profile Targets in France 
France - 13 March 2013 
Two men were arrested in Marignane, and a third as he was in departing for Tunisia in 
connection to a plot to blow up the Eiffel Tower, the Louvre Museum, and an energy 
plant. The operation was triggered by the finding of explosives and bomb making 
instructions in the home of two of the men in Marignane. The three arrestees purportedly 
wanted to devote their attack as a tribute to Mohamed Merah, a jihadi who had killed 
several French servicemen, a rabbi, and jewish children the prior year in Toulouse and 
Mountauban. 
Plot to Attack Targets in Italy 
Italy - 30 April 2013 
Five men aged between 24 and 50 were arrested in 2013 for recruiting, indoctrinating and 
plotting to attack targets throughout Italy; the group had yet to select a specific target. In 
2014 they were sentenced between two years and eight months, and five years and two 
months. Four of the men were of Tunisian family origin, and the remaining perpetrator 
was of Palestinian background. The youngest Tunisian was born in Sicily, whilst the 
ringleader was an imam at a mosque in Bari; it is here that he recruited his cell. In 2014 
they were sentenced between three years and four months, up to five years and two 
months. 
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Plot to Incite Jihadi Terrorism 
Denmark - 14 May 2013 
A Moroccan born Dane was arrested and sentenced to four years in prison for inciting 
hate and breaching Danish terrorism laws; he had been convicted of the same crime in 
2007, and sentenced to three and a half years. The man had migrated from Morocco in 
1983 and gained his Danish citizenship in 1988, and is a father of four. His case became 
known in the media as “The Bookseller from Bronshoj”, and he was alleged to be AQ’s 
main PR man in Europe. 
Lee Rigby Attack - Executed Attack 
UK - 22 May 2013 
In May two British citizens of Nigerian origin assaulted Drummer Lee Rigby on his way 
back to his barracks in Woolwich; upon running him over, they cleaved away at his body 
attempting to behead him. Both men at the time were in their twenties, were converts to 
radical Islam, and met at Greenwich University. In 2014 one man, the principal killer of 
Rigby, was sentenced to life in prison, and the second was sentenced to serve a minimum 
of 45 years behind bars. Ulteriorly, one of the perpetrators had been diagnosed with post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) in his teen years; two of his friends were killed in a drug 
deal gone wrong in front of him. Both are considered to be ‘lone wolf’ operatives, being 
only inspired by groups such as AQ, without possessing any connection to said 
organizations. 
La Défense Attack - Executed Attack 
France - 25 May 2013 
At the end of May 2013 a 20 year old Frenchman attacked a French soldier patrolling a 
train and subway traffic hub. The attacked jumped the serviceman from behind and 
repeatedly stabbed him; he was unsuccessful in killing the man. The perpetrator was 
known to security services; he had converted in the recent years, and showed signs of 
radicalization by refusing a job because he did not want to work with women. At the time 
of the attack the man was unemployed and homeless. 
Plot Establish a Shari4Italy Branch 
Italy - 12 June 2013 
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In June authorities in Brescia arrested a Moroccan twenty year-old, who had been living 
in Italy since he was seven, on suspicion of plotting against Italian targets, hate 
incitement, and for trying to establish a Sharia4 branch in Italy. Albeit the man was 
sentenced to five years in 2013, 15 days after his sentencing he was released on appeal 
and shortly afterwards his tracks were lost. He eventually resurfaced in a 2016 leak of 
ISIS foreign fighters documents listing him as a deceased suicide bomber. 
Lyes Darani Plot 
France - October 2013 
A twenty-one year old foreign fighter returning from Syria from arrested in October 2013 
on suspicion of plotting a terrorist attack in France. Although his plan was not evolved 
enough, as he had not chosen a target yet, authorities decided to arrest him because he 
had shaven his beard, a red-flag for jihad-at-risk individuals. Upon arresting him, 
authorities found a bomb making manual and a letter endorsing a jihadi attack against 
France. He is referred to as a foreign fighter, and not a trainee, because he had been 
involved in a plot targeting Shia Muslims in Lebanon. In 2014 he was charged with 
criminal conspiracy in connection with a terrorist undertaking. 
London “Mumbai” Plot 
UK - 13 October 2013 
In October 2013 MI5 arrested four individuals on suspicion of plotting a “Mumbai-Style” 
attack in London. Two suspects were released, but a British-Turk and a British-Algerian 
were charged with terrorist offenses. The authorities believe they plotted against Tony 
Blair, and security officials, alongside plotting indiscriminate, massive casualties. Police 
wiretaps on the duo brought to light that they spent an unusual amount of money; the 
ringleader purportedly had ties with sons of Azerbaijani ministers, and the British royal 
family. Their trial is significant because it was the first terror trial to initially be held 
completely secret, and subsequently partly-secret. Only ten chosen reporters were 
allowed to attend the trial, on which they could not report until allowed so at a later date, 
and only a small fraction of the trial was held in open court. The names of the defendants 
was not released until the trial was long under way. In 2015 they were found guilty of 
possessing material useful in the preparation of a terrorist plot, a bomb-making manual, 
and sentenced to three and three and a half years behind bars. 
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2014 
Riviera Terror Plot - Foiled Attack 
France - 17 February 2014 
In February 2014 French authorities arrested a foreign fighter returnee, a 23-year-old 
French-Algerian on suspicion of plotting to bomb the annual Nice Carnival. The man, 
who is a suspected member of the Cannes-Torcy cell dismantled in 2012 responsible for 
the attack on a kosher grocery store in Sarcelles and for plotting to attack ulterior Jewish 
locations the same year. In 2012 the man escaped authorities by fleeing to Syria and 
joining the Islamic State, where he is believed to have acquired ulterior skills useful for 
committing a terror act; at the time of writing, it is unclear whether the Riviera plot was 
directed by IS. Upon searching his apartment, French police agents found three Red-Bull 
canisters filled with TATP, a handgun, and a rudimentary IED composed of shrapnel; he 
was allegedly inspired by the Boston Marathon bomber. At the end of 2015 he was on 
trial for terrorism offences, including the bombing of the Kosher grocery store in 2012. 
Brussels Museum Shooting - Executed Attack 
Belgium, France - 24 May 2014 
In May a French-Algerian entered the Jewish Museum in Brussels and opened fire with a 
kalashnikov, killing three people at the scene and mortally wounding a fourth. The modus 
operandi resembled that of Mohammed Merah; he was wearing a chest camera to record 
the violence. The attacker was able to escape Belgian authorities by disguising himself, 
until he was ultimately apprehended in Marseilles, France. The authorities also 
apprehended two other men in connection with the plot; the trio had met and radicalized 
in prison. Moreover, the perpetrator is also a returning foreign fighter, having fought in 
Syria between 2012 and 2014, and has been indicated by former IS captives as a lead 
torturer; his victims/hostages include James Foley and Steven Sotloff. 
Creteil Plot 
France - 5 July 2014 
In July 2014 French authorities arrested a 20-year-old French-Tunisian man and charged 
him with “criminal association with links to a terrorist organization” the same year. The 
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youngster is believed to have been trained in Syria, and to have been initially sent to 
attack Shia targets in Lebanon, and to have been successively been sent to France once 
the original plot was deemed as too low-profile mediatically. The suspected perpetrator 
was an admirer of Mohammed Merah, perpetrator of the Toulouse and Montauban 
shootings, and of Mehdi Nemmouche, whom attacked the Jewish Museum in Brussels in 
2014. French authorities decided to intervene once they intercepted a message he sent to 
IS contacts in Syria stating he was ready to act. 
Ziamani Beheading Plot - Foiled Attack 
UK - 19 August 2014 
In August 2014 UK police and MI5 apprehended an 18-year-old British national of 
Congolese descent for plotting to behead a British soldier with a knife; he was inspired 
by the murder of fusilier Lee Rigby the year prior, and was on his way to commit murder 
when he was stopped. The teenager is of Christian background, and radicalized a few 
months prior to being arrested; once he converted to Islam his parents kicked him out, 
and was taken in by the banned radical organization al-Muhajiroun. Alarmingly, the 
person was arrested on possession of terrorist material (an IS flag) as a minor, was 
released on bail and enrolled in the UK’s counter-radicalization program, PREVENT, 
seemingly to no avail. In March 2015 he was sentenced to 22 years behind bars. 
Plot to Attack the EU Commission 
Belgium, Netherlands - September 2014 
In September a Dutch couple of Turkish origin was arrested by Belgian authorities at the 
Brussels airport; they were on their way back from Turkey, and and had allegedly been to 
Syria. Authorities in Belgium found weapons and bomb making materials in the flat they 
were residing in Brussels, and their Dutch counterparts found jihadi propaganda material 
in their apartment in The Hague. The couple, along with a third on-the-run suspect, are 
believed to have been hatching a plot to attack the European Commission; although no 
concrete plans were consolidated, authorities apprehended them once they found 
weapons in their apartment, and were alarmed by their frequent ‘trails’ around the 
Commission building. 
Surgeon Plot - Foiled Attack 
UK - 7 October 2014 
!  of !18 26
In October 2014 UK police arrested four male suspected jihadi terrorist on suspicion of 
plotting an attack; they coined their network the “Turnup Terror Squad”. Two of them are 
students, on at King’s College in London and the other in Sudan; the latter is believed to 
be the ring leader, and is also the son of a Saudi diplomat. Allegedly, he came in contact 
with Islamic State operatives and successively recruited his childhood friend, whom at 
them time was studying at King’s, and maintained contact with IS throughout the 
planning. The duo intended to drive around on a moped, and shoot bystanders equipped 
with a silencer; they were in possessions of all utensils, minus a determined target. 
Evidence from their secret online chatroom showed how they wanted to respond to the 
recent IS fatwa. In March 2016 they were found guilty of terrorism charges. Conversely, 
the other two men were acquitted of terror charges, but guilty of firearm violations, 
including providing the weapons to the former duo. The quartet’s trial is scheduled to 
continue in 2016. 
Vienna Teenager Plot 
Austria - October 2014 
In October 2014 Austrian authorities arrested a 14-year-old Turkish boy for plotting to 
blow up Vienna’s Westbahnhof train station; he intended to flee and join IS afterwards. At 
the time of his arrest he had been living in Austria with his mother for eight years, and 
was researching how to build improvised cluster bombs, similar to those used by the 
Boston Marathon bomber. He had been voicing support for IS on social media. 
Furthermore, the boy had been offered $25,000 and a special position in IS if he executed 
the attacks; the offer was made online. In May 2015 an Austrian court sentenced him to 
eight month of juvenile detention.  
Remembrance Day Plot - Foiled Attack 
UK - 6 November 2014 
In November 2014 UK authorities arrested four men on suspicion of planning a terrorist 
attack during Remembrance Day; one was later released, whilst the other three are 
undergoing trials at the time of writing. The trio, composed of two cousins and a friend, 
reportedly radicalized at a local mosque and are of Pakistani origin. Notably, the cousins 
were in college and the friend was a professional chef; they wanted to travel to Syria to 
partake in jihad, and grew disgruntled when they were not allowed to do so. Furthermore, 
prosecutors allege that they were responding to the fatwa emitted by IS a few weeks 
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prior, and that they were inspired by the murder of fusilier Lee Rigby in 2013. In fact, 
they intended to attack the event’s attendees with the intention of beheading someone, 
and had bought numerous knifes in the days leading up to the ceremony promoting the 
intervention of armed police. At the beginning of 2016 the elder cousin has been found 
guilty and awaits his sentence, whilst the remaining two will face a retrial as the jury 
could not reach a verdict the first time around. 
Tours Knife Attack - Executed Attack 
France - 20 December 2014 
On 20 December 2014, in Tours, France, a 20-year-old French man of Burundian origins 
charged the local police station, and slashed three officers before being killed himself. 
Upon slicing the first policeman he screamed “Allahu Akbar”. The man was a former 
rapper, and a recent convert suffering from psychological disorders. Although he was 
known to authorities for petty crimes, he was not on any terrorism watch list; his brother 
was. His brother, who was in Burundi at the time of the attack, posted an ISIS flag on 
profile shortly after the perpetrator; he was consequently arrested by the authorities. 
Nevertheless, this case was still labelled as a “lone-wolf” case by the media. 
Dijon Attack - Executed Attack 
France - 21 December 2014 
A 40-year-old French man of North African origins drove his Renault Clio into a crowd 
of pedestrians screaming “Allahu Akbar” in Dijon on 21 December injuring 13 persons, a 
day after the Tours Knife Attack. The man had manifested an increased interest in Islamic 
fundamentalism shortly before the attack, yet he had been suffering for decades of 
psychological disorders. Consequently, the authorities denied any link with official terror 
organizations, although IS had been calling for “lone-wolf” attacks in France in response 
of its increased adversarial military campaign. 
Nantes Attack - Executed Attack 
France - 22 December 2014 
On 22 December, the day following the Dijon Attack an apparent copy-cat attack took 
place in Nantes; a 37-year-old man drove his van through the local Christmas market 
screaming “Allahu Akbar”. Shortly after the incident, the man stabbed himself 13 times 
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in the chest; he was drunk at the time, and had a prior history of alcoholism and 
psychological problems. 
2015 
Charlie Hebdo Attack - Executed Attack 
France - 7 January 2015 
On January 7th 2015 two French-Algerian brothers stormed the headquarters of Charlie 
Hebdo, a satirical magazine in Paris, killing the editor and several staffers. The tabloid is 
questions is known for publishing controversial cartoons on the Prophet Mohammed. The 
gunmen were eventually gun-downed by French anti-terrorism forces after escaping into 
an industrial site and taking hostages; in this instance they also claimed to be working for 
AQAP, which claimed responsibility the same month. The two brothers were born in 
Paris, and became orphans at a young age; albeit they had a secular background, during 
their early teenage years they converted and during their subsequent jail terms they were 
radicalized by Djamal Beghal.  
Coulibaly Attack - Executed Attack 
France - 7 January 2015 
A French-Malian, who claimed to be working coordinately with the Charlie Hebdo 
attackers, first shot and wounded a jogger, successively killed a police officer, and 
ultimately took hostages at a Jewish supermarket as the Kouachi brothers were being 
rounded up. He was eventually shot dead by French anti-terror forces after a five hour-
long crisis. The hostage taker was reportedly radicalized by Djamal Beghal in prison, and 
partook in the same plot to break out of prison Islamist radical Ali Belkacem with the 
Kouachi brothers in 2013. A few days prior to the attacks at Charlie Hebdo and those 
perpetrated by Coulibaly, the latter’s wife travelled to Syria via Turkey by first flying out 
of Madrid. Authorities reported over 500 calls between Coulibaly’s wife and one of the 
Kouachi brothers’ wife throughout 2014, suggesting she played a coordinating role in the 
network.  
Verviers Plot - Foiled Attack 
Belgium - 15 January 2015 
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In January 2015 Belgian police raided the houses of suspected jihadi terrorists fearing 
they were finalizing their plans. Upon arriving at one of the locations in Verviers the 
officers were promptly welcomed; the inhabitants began firing with kalashnikovs and 
grenades. Once the dust settled two of the three persons were killed, and the third 
apprehended as he tried to flee. Inside the apartment were three men, two of which now 
dead, TATP chemicals, police uniforms, and GoPro cameras. Intercepted conversations of 
the plotters highlight how they sought to target police officers, as well as other highly 
symbolic targets. Notably, the two slayed perpetrators had spent time in Syria the year 
prior, receiving training from IS. Consequently, authorities allege they were being 
coordinated by Abdelhamid Abaaoud, the mastermind behind the November 2015 Paris 
Attack, point to communication between said individual and the Verviers cell. The third 
man is currently on trial, scheduled to begin May 9th 2016; he is on trial with 15 other 
persons. Unfortunately the trial at the time of writing is sealed, meaning it was possible to 
obtain information only of the most prominent individuals involved in the plot.      
Copenhagen Shootings - Executed Attack 
Denmark - 14 February 2015 
In February 2015 a Dane of Palestinian origins assaulted a cultural center, the 
Krudttønden in Copenhagen, shooting some 40 rounds resulting in the death of a 
filmmaker; Swedish cartoonist Lars Vilks was also attending. The 22-year-old man 
escaped and managed to execute a second attack at a synagogue were he killed a security 
guard and injured two police officers. He was eventually shot and killed by the police. 
The youngster had a troubled past riddled with gang violence, for which he was 
incarcerated. He was reportedly radicalized in prison by a cellmate, and kicked out of his 
gang upon being released for his polarized views. Nine minutes before carrying out the 
attack he declared his allegiance to IS via social media. 
Catalonia Plot 
Spain - 8 April 2015 
In April 2015 Spanish authorities arrested 11 suspected jihadi terrorist around Barcelona, 
and jailed seven as their trial date had to be set. They are accused of plotting 
“kidnappings, an execution and attacks on Jewish shops”; kidnapping individuals and 
dressing them in orange jump suits, and beading them IS-style. The group self-named 
itself the “Islamic Brotherhood for Jihad Predication” and had previously tried to send 
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members to Syria; once they were intercepted in Bulgaria those remaining in Spain 
decided to focus on jihad domestically. The seven included in our dataset are aged 
between 17 and 45, and were led by a Spanish hairdresser who had convert to Islam; six 
men had Spanish citizenship, with the youngest being of Paraguayan origins, and the 
seventh was a Moroccan woman. Police officers, upon raiding the ring-leader’s home, 
found a cache of weapons, including grenades, military firearms, ammunition and 
sharpshooter rifle scopes. The judge presiding the case has placed a “gag order” (S: 
WSJ), and the court sessions are held behind closed doors. 
French Church Plot  
France - 19 April 2015 
In April 2015 French police apprehended a 24-year-old French Algerian who was 
believed to be plotting terrorist attacks on churches around Paris, notably on directives of 
a contact in Syria. The suspect was a computer science student, and he was arrested after 
accidentally shooting himself in the leg and genitals; he allegedly was trying to steal the 
car of a woman, who died in the incident. Upon raiding his apartment, authorities found 
weapons, ammunitions, bullet proof vests, notes on alternative targets and “documents 
linked to AQ and IS.” According to reports, his family also held Islamic fundamentalist 
views that, albeit not jihadi in nature, could have reinforced the individual’s beliefs. At 
the time of writing he is on trial and incarcerated. Since, three others have been detained 
and charged, but not enough information could be found on them and their roles within 
he network to include them in our dataset. 
Plot to Attack the Frankfurt Bike Race - Foiled Attack 
Germany - 29 April 2015 
In April 2015 German police arrested a German of Turkish descent and his wife, also of 
Turkish descent, for plotting to attack the Frankfurt Bike Race, scheduled for May 1st. 
Upon raiding the suspects’ home police found a functional ope bomb, three liters of 
hydrogen peroxide, ammunition, and parts of a G3 assault rifle. The man at the time of 
arrest was an unemployed former chemistry student who had grown Selfist views in the 
time leading up to the arrest; ulteriorly, he had know connections to the Sauerland 
network. The relationship between the the couple and their individual roles at the time of 
writing is unclear; the man’s trial began in January 2016, and the woman was released 
after being detained for several weeks. 
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London Bombing 10th Anniversary Plot - Foiled Attack 
UK - 28 May 2015 
In May 2015 British authorities arrested a couple in their mid-twenties for plotting an 
attack to on the anniversary of the 7/7 bombings. At the time they were being surveilled 
by counter-terrorism forces they were completing a bomb; they were just a few days 
away from being finished. Their intended target was either a major mall or subway. 
Interestingly enough, the wife played a logistical and ideological support role towards her 
husband; she single handedly funded the operation, and reinforced his jihadi convictions. 
In December 2015 he was sentenced to serve a life sentence with a minimum of 27 years; 
she was sentenced to serve life a life sentence with a minimum of 25 years, the longest 
ever handed to a female jihadist in the UK. (S:NBC) 
Lyon Gas Factory Attack - Executed Attack 
France - 26 June 2015 
In June 2015 a French father of three of Arab descent mounted an attack on a US owned 
gas plant outside Lyon. The man attempted to blow up the gas cylinders by ramming his 
car in them, and killed his boss, severed his head and put it on a fence; according to his 
lawyer he had personal grievances with him. The attack ended once he was apprehended 
by firefighters, who turned him over to the police. The man at the time of the attack was 
employed as a truck driver at the gas plant, and had radicalized years prior at a French 
Salafi Mosque. In December 2015 he hanged himself in his cell while awaiting trial. 
Thalys Train Attack - Foiled Attack 
Belgium, France, Netherlands - 21 August 2015  
In August a Moroccan homeless man boarded the high speed Thalys train from 
Amsterdam to Paris with an AKM assault rifle and 270 rounds of ammunition. Once he 
tried to attack the passengers his weapon jammed and he was subdued by three 
passengers. The man, a former mobile company employee, was charged on August 25 
with attempted murder of terrorist nature and was remanded in custody. Interestingly, the 
man claims that he found the weapons in a suitcase, along with a phone, while he was 
sleeping in a park in Brussels. Further questions remain how he could afford a ticket on 
the Thalys, which costs around 150 euros. 
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Berlin Knife Attack - Executed Attack 
Germany - 17 September 2015 
In early September an Iraqi born asylum seeker that had been living in Germany attacked 
a police officer with a knife, stabbing her in the neck before being killed himself by 
another officer. The man had been convicted in 2008 for plot to kill then Iraqi PM Iyad 
Allaw, and had just been recently released. This incident was categorized by the 
authorities as a lone-wolf incident; the man acted alone, with no accomplices and on his 
own whim. 
Toulon Naval Base Plot - Foiled Attack 
France - 29 October 2015 
In October 2015 a French man of Toulon was arrested and charged in November with 
plotting to attack the local naval base, home to 70% of France’s navy. The 25-year-old 
man was prompted to attack by a French contact fighting with IS in Syria, and followed 
his suggestions of acquiring a kalashnikov. However, the wannabe jihadist, lacking a 
criminal record and connections, had to settle for a knife and a black hoodie. This 
purchase, in conjunction with his social media activities, prompted authorities to 
intervene. The man had reportedly radicalized in the beginning of 2014, and had his 
passport revoked for attempting to travel to Syria for jihadi purposes. 
November 2015 Paris Attacks - Executed Attack 
France - 13 November 2015 
On the evening of 13 November 2015, a series of coordinated jihadi terror attacks took 
place throughout France, and its northern suburb of Saint-Denis. Three suicide bombers 
detonated news the Stade de France, where the international match between France and 
Germany was being played; three attacked the Bataclan Theatre; and a third team of gun 
men attacked restaurants in central Paris, with one of the men detonating an explosive 
vest. The assailants killed 130, and injured almost 400 people. The suspected ringleader, 
Abdelhamid Abaaoud, was killed on November 18th in a raid in Saint-Denis along with 
two others; one of these was his cousin, who had provided logistic support for the escape. 
At the time of writing, of the people in custody, only three could be discerned as 
implicated directly in the attacks; whilst ten have either been killed by the police during 
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the attacks and subsequent raids, or they committed suicide during the assault. Notably, 
the core of the group including Abaaoud himself grew up together in the Molenbeek 
neighborhood in Brussels. Here he recruited his best friend fro childhood, the Abdeslam 
brothers, and a few others implicated in these attacks. Furthermore, Abaaoud is linked 
with a terror cell in Verviers, the foiled attack on a Thalys train directed to Paris, and an 
attack at a church in the same city he would attack in November. Counter-terrorism 
experts believe he was close to IS leader Abu Bakr al-Bagdadi, and the link between 
operations in Syria and Europe. At the time of writing the three surviving persons directly 
implicated in this attack remain in Belgian custody; two of these are allegedly involved in 
the March 2016 Brussels attacks as well. 
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